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I. INTRODUCTION
Morning and evening
Maids heard the goblins cry:
'Come buy our orchard fruits,
Come buy, come buy...
Figs to fill your mouth,
Citrons from the South,
Sweet to tongue and sound to eye;
Come buy, come buy'
Like the enticing goblin cry in Christina Rossetti's poem, some
lower courts have rushed to the goblin market and bought arguments that
are "sweet to tongue and sound to eye" 2 but ultimately destructive to the
clear meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.3
The Quill decision placed Due Process Clause 4 and Commerce
Clause5 constraints on the fifty states by limiting their ability to impose
sales and use tax collection requirements on out-of-state businesses that
t Assistant Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law; J.D. 1994 & LL.M. (taxation)
1995, Georgetown University Law Center. The author is indebted to all those who helped by review-
ing drafts of this Article: Professor John A. Swain, University of Arizona School of Law, and Asso-
ciate Dean Gregory Brandes, Concord Law School. The author would also like to thank his law
clerks, Anetria K. Connell, David C. Robinson, and Mitchell R. Whatley, for contributing to the
research and writing of this Article, and the staff at the Multistate Tax Commission for providing
many useful suggestions.
1. Christina G. Rossetti, Goblin Market, in THE NEW OXFORD BOOK OF VICTORIAN VERSE 284
(Christopher Ricks ed., 1987) (1862).
2. Id.
3. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
4. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... U .S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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conduct business in their states, without regard to the market share those
businesses command. 6 This was certainly good news for the out-of-state
businesses but bad news for their in-state competitors, who must com-
pete at a four to eleven percent sales tax disadvantage depending on the
jurisdiction,7 which is the profit margin in many industries.8
Prior to Quill, the Supreme Court was often unclear on the jurispru-
dential underpinnings of its state sales and use tax decisions.9 Quill was
the first case in which the Court analyzed these underpinnings and
clearly identified their constitutional foundations.1l The result was a bi-
furcated analysis that addresses the only two constitutional provisions
implicated in state sales and use tax jurisdictional questions-the Com-
merce Clause and the Due Process Clause. 1 The Court's bifurcated
analysis has created confusion, and taxpayers, administrative agencies,
and state courts have struggled in applying the tests required under these
two clauses. 12
The first step to eliminating this confusion is a subtle, yet straight-
forward observation: the Court in Quill merely required use of two famil-
iar, widely-used constitutional tests-minimum contacts and physical
presence-to provide what it thought would be a convenient and useful
6. Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-06. For example, Quill Corporation was "the sixth largest vendor of
office supplies in [North Dakota]." Id at 302. Its market share was ultimately irrelevant, and Quill
was held to be exempt from North Dakota's regulatory tax authority on Negative Commerce Clause
grounds. Id. at 318.
7. Interestingly, the city of Arab in Cullman County, Alabama, has the distinction of having the
highest combined state and local sales tax rate in the nation at eleven percent. National Sales Taxes
Reach Record Levels in 2003, Bus. WIRE, Feb. 9, 2004. Conventional wisdom when traveling
through small towns is not to speed, here it might be not to spend.
8. For instance, Amazon.com, a well known major e-tailer located in Seattle, WA, posts its
profit margin as 7.62%. AMZN: Key Statistics for AMAZON.COM INC, http://finance.yahoo.com/
q/ks?s=AMZN (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). Amazon is not required to collect sales or use taxes
unless purchasers of their products live in particular states: "Items sold by Amazon.com LLC, or its
subsidiaries, and shipped to destinations in the states of Kansas, North Dakota, or Washington are
subject to tax." Amazon.com Help: Ordering from Amazon.com / Sales Tax, http://www.amazon
.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/468512/104-5366483-6269549 (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). If Amazon
was subject to sales or use tax requirements, the playing field would be leveled in states where Ama-
zon is not currently collecting sales or use taxes.
9. See, e.g., Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967) (explaining
that Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause claims are similar); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S.
207, 211-12 (1960) (holding independent contractors create nexus but commingling Commerce
Clause and Due Process Clause tests); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954) ("Our
decisions are not always clear as to the grounds on which a tax is supported, especially where more
than one exists.").
10. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 ("[A]lthough we have not always been precise in distinguishing
between the two, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are analytically distinct.").
11. Id.
12. See discussion infra Part lI.C.
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method of analyzing sales and use tax jurisdiction problems.' 3 The Due
Process Clause nexus test is based on notions of fairness 4 and relies on
the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,5
and its progeny.' 6 The Commerce Clause nexus test is based on the need
for a free flow of goods within the national economy' 7 and relies on a
bright-line physical presence test 8 reminiscent of the Pennoyer era.' 9
13. See discussion infra Parts lI.B.i, III.A.
14. Quill, 504 U.S. at 299. "Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its contents
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of
this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of re-
spect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Whether Justice Harlan
was correct in his appraisal of what due process "is," he seems to capture much of what the Supreme
Court has meant (for at least forty years) when it has made reference to the concept.
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Although this landmark case is mainly known today for its rejection
of the Due Process Clause physical presence test and establishing the minimum contacts test, Inter-
national Shoe is a state tax case where the Court rejected the taxpayer's contention that the Com-
merce Clause and Due Process Clause were violated.
16. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (Rudzewicz purposefully
availed himself of the protection of Florida law through a franchise contract with Burger King);
World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (no "minimum contacts" because
World Wide Volkswagen had not attempted to serve the Oklahoma market when selling a car in
New York); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (no "purposeful availment"); McGee v. Int'l
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (sometimes called the "single contact" case).
17. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995) (explaining Com-
merce Clause was created to prevent the economic Balkanization that occurred under the Articles of
Confederation). Quill involves the Court's application of the Negative Commerce Clause, also re-
ferred to as the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Negative Commerce Clause is a judicially created
doctrine, first mentioned by Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). The
framers of the Constitution and early Supreme Court decisions were heavily influenced by John
Locke and Adam Smith, who both held that man's rights could be protected only if the right to prop-
erty was protected. Locke declared that the "great and chief end... of men's uniting into Common-
wealths, and putting themselves under Government is the preservation of their property." JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 395 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963)
(1698) (emphasis added). Smith's contribution was the notion of the "invisible hand," meaning that
traders looking to serve their own best interests in a free market would inevitably create all the mate-
rial goods we would require while encouraging what Locke described as "the honest industry of all
mankind." In short, the framers not only knew the importance of economic growth, but they also
claimed to know how to promote it. To preserve property rights and thereby encourage honest indus-
try and free trade, the states had to be restrained from creating obstacles to such industry and trade.
The Negative Commerce Clause, then, is a protective mechanism derived from Congress's explicit
power to regulate commerce "among the several States" under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
Constitution. As Marshall noted in Gibbons, the power to regulate commerce, so far as it extends, is
exclusively vested in Congress, and no part of it can be exercised by a state. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 2.
Although late 19th- and early 20th-century economic theories (primarily those of Marx and Keynes,
respectively) shifted the focus away from a strict protection of property rights, under today's rules a
state violates the Negative Commerce Clause if it either discriminates against interstate commerce or
places an undue burden on it. State sales and use taxes affecting interstate commerce have undergone
a similar shift and are generally more widely tolerated, although they are still subject to essentially
similar constitutional tests, for example those found in Quill.
18. Professor John Swain is correct by noting that "[t]he physical presence test is a relic of [a]
bygone era. The time is past when physical presence could be treated as a meaningful surrogate for
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When both tests are satisfied, a business has "sufficient nexus"'20 with a
state to come under that state's sales and use tax jurisdiction.2'
The difficulty in applying Quill is not its complexity, but rather its
simplicity. Its stated purpose was to bring certainty to the area of sales
and use tax collection-to drain the tax jurisdiction swamp, not to make
it murkier.22 The solution to the problem is surprisingly simple: apply the
Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause in reverse order. Cur-
rently, courts go through a quick, perfunctory Due Process Clause analy-
sis and then move into a detailed Commerce Clause analysis. 23 This ap-
proach invariably leads courts to consider fairness 2 4 within a Commerce
the economic presence sufficient to make a seller the subject of state taxation." John A. Swain, State
Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the Twenty-First Century, 38 GA.
L. REV. 343, 392 (2003). Justice White notes that "[tihe illogic of retaining the physical-presence
requirement in these circumstances is palpable." Quill, 504 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
19. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Prior to International Shoe, the Court required
that an out-of-state defendant have physical presence in the forum jurisdiction to satisfy due process
concerns.
20. See discussion infra Part lI.B.ii. As explained in more detail later in this Article, "sufficient
nexus" is a legal term of art that has been used by the Court interchangeably with the phrase "sub-
stantial nexus." This Article follows the Court's example and likewise uses the two phrases syn-
onymously. Attempts to distinguish the two phrases border on the absurd.
21. The focus of this Article is on the jurisdictional standards applicable to sales and use taxes.
There is a debate raging in the scholarly literature over the proper application of Quill to other state
and local taxes with one well-respected academic explaining that "Quill's holding does not apply
directly to corporate income taxes [as] ... the Court painstakingly limited its analysis throughout the
opinion to sales and use taxes .... [P]hysical presence is not an income tax nexus requirement."
John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 319, 337, 372 (2003). A number of state courts have also held that the Quill physical
presence test is limited to sales and use taxation. See, e.g., Borden Chems. & Plastics, L.P. v.
Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("The Quill court merely carved out a narrow excep-
tion in the area of use tax collection duties."); Couchot v. State Lottery Comm'n, 659 N.E.2d 1225,
1230 (Ohio 1996) ("There is no indication in Quill that the Supreme Court will extend the physical-
presence requirement to cases involving taxation measured by income derived from the state.");
Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 23 n.4 (S.C. 1993) (corporation without physical
presence was held subject to the state corporate net income tax). In addition to courts rejecting
Quill's application to state income taxes, one court has rejected its application to the property tax.
See Annox, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, No. K-19039 (Ky. B.T.A. Nov. 18, 2003) ("The Supreme
Court expressly held that it had not applied the physical presence test to taxes other than sales and
use .... The tax at issue here is a property tax. Therefore, Annox must have some connection, but
not physical presence, with Kentucky for the public service corporation property tax to survive An-
nox's Commerce Clause challenge.").
22. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-16.
23. See, e.g, In re Family of Eagles, Ltd., 66 P.3d 858, 863 (Kan. 2003) (dismissing Due Proc-
ess Clause concerns in a few lines and spending several pages discussing the Commerce Clause test).
24. The concept of fairness springs from International Shoe where the Court "framed the rele-
vant inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum contacts with the jurisdiction 'such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Quill, 504
U.S. at 307 (citations omitted).
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Clause context.2 5 Instead, courts should look first at the Commerce
Clause nexus test and then at the Due Process Clause nexus test. Using
this approach, courts are unlikely to import fairness considerations into
the Commerce Clause analysis. As a consequence, they will apply the
bright-line physical presence test mandated in Quill more consistently.
This preserves the simplicity Quill purported to create without altering
Quill in any significant way.26
Part II of this Article begins with a brief introduction to sales and
use taxes in the United States.27 Although these taxes are complementary
in nature, they are treated differently for constitutional purposes. 8 This
Part then examines the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause con-
straints on state taxation,29 which are animated by very different con-
cems. 30 Next, this Part explores footnote eight in Quill to dispel the no-
tion that Quill established a facts-and-circumstances test.31 The section
concludes by discussing the problems lower courts have had in applying
the Quill nexus tests. The primary problem encountered by the lower
courts, exemplified by four lower court opinions,32 involves fact patterns
near the bright-line that involve some quantum of physical presence but
something less than a permanent physical presence in the taxing jurisdic-
tion.33
Part III will then look at ways of bridging the apparent Quill chasm.
First, there is a step back to an earlier era in Due Process Clause juris-
prudence with an examination of the physical presence test that existed
prior to International Shoe.34 The idea is to take the lessons from that era
(i.e., due process cases decided using a physical presence test) and trans-
fer them into the Commerce Clause context. After all, it seems pointless
to relitigate issues that were decided eighty years ago. Once a nexus is
established, the next logical question is "When does it end?" The Article
25. See discussion infra Part iI.C.i.
26. Ideally, Congress or the Supreme Court should eliminate the physical presence requirement
as a relic of a bygone era. The Court abandoned the physical presence test for due process purposes
in International Shoe, and it should have done so in Quill. However, until the rule is changed, the
rule that does exist should be applied appropriately.
27. See discussion infra Part II.A.
28. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION § 4.13[2][c] (3d ed.
2005).
29. See discussion infra Part lI.B.
30. See supra notes 14, 17, and accompanying text.
31. See discussion infra Part lI.B.iv.
32. In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d I II (Kan. 2000); Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Share
Int'l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1996); Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654 N.E.2d 954 (N.Y.
1995); Care Computer Sys. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, No. 1049-93-S (Ariz. B.T.A. April 4, 1995).
33. No one would seriously contend that a corporation's manufacturing plant, headquarters, or
distribution facility is insufficient to satisfy a state's taxation jurisdiction.
34. See discussion infra Part IlI.A.
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spends some time in this Part looking at the various approaches states
have taken in answering that question.35
Part III also proposes a model statute to deal with the perceived un-
fairness of taxing very small businesses through a minimum filing
threshold. 36 With the power to tax comes the responsibility to tax effi-
ciently. 37 Administrative costs are associated with having an out-of-state
business comply with a state's regulatory taxing authority, both to the
business and to the state.38 A bright-line physical presence test might re-
quire very small businesses-those with $100 of sales tax liability or less
a year-to file sales and use tax returns. The states would be better off
creating a mechanism to exempt these small businesses because the cost
of collecting this revenue might exceed the tax collected.
The conclusion of Part III discusses the ethical and professional
considerations the tax profession is dealing with not only at the practical
level, but more importantly at the philosophical level. At its root, the
fundamental problem facing the profession today is the question whether
truth is relative or universal. 39 To the extent people reject objectivity,
their philosophy will likely be reflected in their court submissions, which
may then appear in a court opinion.
This Article hopes to make a contribution by helping states
strengthen their sales tax base and assisting taxpayers in understanding
their legal obligations. Whether state revenues are up or down,40 it cannot
35. See discussion infra Part III.B.
36. I have placed the threshold at $100 in tax liability, though this number is purely arbitrary
on my part. A state may believe that it can collect less than $100 in tax efficiently, or it may believe
that a larger amount is more appropriate.
37. DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, THE EDUCATION OF A CHRISTIAN PRINCE 215-16 (Lester K. Born
trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1936) (1516).
The most desirable way of increasing the revenue is to cut off the worse than useless ex-
travagances, to abolish the idle ministries, to avoid wars and long travels, which are very
like wars [in their bad effects], to suppress graft among the office holders, and to be in-
terested in the proper administration of the kingdom rather than in the extension of its
boundaries.
Id.
38. Administrative costs include the cost of hiring employees to process tax returns, maintain-
ing space to store tax returns, and hiring computer personnel for electronic filing of tax returns.
39. See discussion infra Part I1I.D.
40. States are recovering from record deficits and reduced state government spending. NAT'L
GOVERNORS ASS'N & NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES
10 (2003), http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/fiscsurv/fsfalI2003.pdf.
Continuing the pattern states have become too familiar with since the bull market ended,
revenue collections in fiscal 2003 continued to dwindle. Following a booming economy
that generated exceptional state tax receipts-particularly from personal income taxes
that included record capital gains, options, and bonuses-and then a dramatic fall, recov-
ery shuffled to take hold. Two years of economic doldrums have resulted in an uncertain
revenue outlook, as sales, personal income, and corporate income tax collections all
missed their projected marks in fiscal 2003. For fiscal 2004, thirty-six states enacted tax
[Vol. 29:581
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be emphasized enough that "taxes are the life-blood of government, and
their prompt and certain availability an imperious need.' 4' A bright-line
test, admittedly an artificial construct, has the primary advantage of pro-
viding notice to those that cross the line that they must collect the tax.
Taxation is not just another area of government regulation: in the words
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "[t]axes are what we pay for civi-
lized society. 42
II. UNDERSTANDING SALES AND USE TAXES,
THE QUILL NEXUS STANDARDS,
AND THEIR APPLICATION
The primary focus of this Article is the application of the Due Proc-
ess and Commerce Clauses to sales and use taxes, but a discussion of
these constitutional constraints without some context might be confusing.
Thus, a short history and basic understanding of how these taxes work
are necessary.
and fee increases totaling a net $9.6 billion, in concert with another round of massive
budget cuts, the use of reserve funds, and the implementation of an extensive array of
other budget-balancing strategies. States also enacted $3 billion of revenue measures that
enhance general fund revenue but do not affect taxpayer liability, such as deferrals of tax
phase-outs, tax amnesty programs, and accelerated remittance of sales taxes by vendors.
Id. (citation omitted). However, state fiscal conditions fluctuate and a fiscal crisis can be followed by
a year of plenty. This Article's argument is based not on financial necessity, but on notions of re-
sponsible federalism. Only when states control their tax base can they implement sound fiscal poli-
cies.
41. Franchise Tax Bd. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 523 (1984).
42. Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). Taxes buy society many things, including a functioning legal system. We often take
for granted the notion of a legal system, but what happens when that legal system is not in place? In
People v. Williams, I Idaho 85 (1866), the Territorial Supreme Court of Idaho dealt with that ques-
tion. Williams was arrested and charged with the crime of highway robbery for an act he committed
in September 1863. Id. In March of 1863, Congress had created the Territory of Idaho "by cutting
off certain territory from the already organized territories of Washington, Dakota, Nebraska, and
Utah." Id. at 86. Unfortunately, Congress did not create a criminal code for the new territory and the
new territorial legislature had not yet met by the date of Williams' act. Id. The court held that be-
cause no criminal law existed in September 1863, Williams could not be held criminally liable for
any crime. Id.
It is taxes that pay the salaries of the legislators who make the laws, the police officers who enforce
the laws, and the judges who administer the laws. Both in-state residents and out-of-state companies
that would do business in the state benefit from a fully functioning state government, funded by tax
dollars. It is hard to imagine any out-of-state business willing to do business in a jurisdiction where
its employees could be killed with impunity and its goods stolen without recourse, or at least it is
hard to imagine such a situation with goods and services being priced at peace time market rates.
Presumably there are some willing to take on higher risks for much higher profits.
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A. Sales and Use Taxes
Apples and quinces,
Lemons and oranges,
Plump unpecked cherries,
Melons and raspberries,
Bloom-down-cheeked peaches,
Swart-headed mulberries,
Wild free-born cranberries,
Crab-apples, dewberries,
Pine-apples, blackberries,
Apricots, strawberries;-
All ripe together
43
Most Americans live in states with a sales tax, but few understand
how this pervasive tax operates. The sales tax is a tax on commerce with
all purchases of tangible personal property, including wild free-born
cranberries, subject to it unless specifically excluded by statute. 44 It is a
tax on consumption45 charged to consumers 46 in the jurisdiction in which
43. Rossetti, supra note 1, at 284.
44. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 28, § 12.04[l] ("Sales taxes in most states are
designed to tax all retail sales of tangible personal property, unless explicitly exempted .... ).
45. It is probably more accurate to say that a sales tax is "primarily" a tax on consumption.
Consumption is defined as "[t]he act of destroying a thing by using it; the use of a thing in a way that
thereby exhausts it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 336 (8th ed. 2004). The following is an intellectu-
ally simple example of consumption: a Californian visits Washington, D.C. and purchases a hot dog
and drink for lunch. Both items are completely consumed in the District of Columbia. However, that
same tourist purchases a replica of the United States Capitol dome in a snow globe. That item is left
in its box and is not opened by the tourist until he is back home in California, where it spends the
next fifty years on a shelf. The item cannot be said to be "exhausted" in the District of Columbia, but
rather it is consumed in California. Assuming that California and the District of Columbia have the
same tax rates, it is theoretically possible to have this tourist pay a second consumption tax on the
snow globe in Califomia and then seek a refund from the District of Columbia; however, such a
system would be horribly complicated and inefficient. Efficiency wins out over theory.
46. A Multistate Tax Commission document explains that
[t]here are three types of sales and use taxes: a vendee form, a vendor form and a com-
bined form. A vendee sales tax is a sales tax that places the legal incidence of the tax on
the purchaser, even though the seller may be required to collect and remit the tax from
collections made from the purchaser. A tax that places the legal incidence of the sales tax
on the seller but also requires the seller to collect the tax from the purchaser is also a
vendee sales tax. A vendor sales tax is a sales tax that places the legal incidence of the tax
on the seller, even though the seller may have the option to collect the tax from the pur-
chaser. A combined sales tax is a sales tax that displays aspects of both a vendee form
and a vendor form.
State Participant Revised Public Participation Working Group Draft of the Constitutional Nexus
Guideline for Application of a State's Sales and Use Tax to an Out-of-State Business 2 (1998),
http://www.mtc.gov/PPWGs/Nexus/nexus24.pdf [hereinafter Constitutional Nexus Guideline]. The
most common type of sales tax in the United States is one in which the seller is required to add the
sales tax to all sales it makes at retail unless the sale is exempt from the sales tax. See, e.g.,
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the sale occurs, with the retailer assigned the legal responsibility for col-
lecting the tax based on a percentage of the gross receipts from the sale.47
The use tax is complementary to the sales tax, and is largely restricted to
goods purchased outside the state.48 It seems odd to have two taxes that
are basically identical-to tax the same items49 at the same rates50 with
the same exemptions, 5' and to require retailers to collect both taxes 52 _
but the system works like this only because of a historical anachronism
of constitutional proportions that has been preserved to this day.
The modem retail sales tax was introduced during the Great De-
pression as a way for the states to generate revenue at a time when reve-
nue from state income tax was in dramatic decline. 53 Constitutional liti-
gation following the introduction of the sales tax focused on the legiti-
macy of the states' ability to impose their sales taxes on interstate sales;"over-the-counter transactions present[ed] no federal constitutional prob-
lems."54 In 1944, the Court held that "[a] sales tax is a tax on the freedom
of purchase . . . . [And] [a] use tax is a tax on the enjoyment of that
which was purchased .... Though sales and use taxes may secure the
same revenues and serve complementary purposes, they are ... taxes on
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 343 (1819) (sales to the federal government are
exempt under the Supremacy Clause).
47. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 297A.62, subd. 1 (2001) ("Except as otherwise provided . . . a
sales tax of 6.5 percent is imposed on the gross receipts from retail sales as defined in section
297A.61, subdivision 4, made in this state or to a destination in this state by a person who is required
to have or voluntarily obtains a permit under section 297A.83, subdivision .").
48. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 28, § 16.01. For example, a California tourist
comes to Washington, D.C. and sees a surfboard emblazoned with a picture of the Jefferson Memo-
rial that he wants to purchase, but he really does not want to take it back to California on the air-
plane. He can have the seller ship it directly to his home in California. The District of Columbia will
not impose its sales tax because the item was shipped by the seller to an out-of-state location, but
California will want the use tax as the sales tax was not paid in Washington, D.C. Likewise, if this
Californian had instead seen the surfboard while surfing the Internet, he could have ordered it from
California with exactly the same tax consequences-no tax to Washington, D.C., but a use tax obli-
gation to California.
49. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3603 (2004) (sales tax is imposed on the retail sale of
tangible personal property in Kansas), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3703 (2004) (use tax is imposed
on the amount of consideration paid for tangible personal property consumed in Kansas).
50. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3603 (2004).
51. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3 703 (2004).
52. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3604 (2004) (sales tax is paid by consumers and collected
by retailers), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3705a (2004) (use tax is paid by consumers and collected
by retailers).
53. H.R. REP. No. 89-565, at 608-09 (1965). The "Willis Committee Report," as this report is
known in the literature (Edwin E. Willis was chairman of the Special Subcommittee on State Taxa-
tion of Interstate Commerce), is the federal government's only examination of state and local taxa-
tion on a comprehensive basis. Between 1932 and 1937, thirty-one states adopted sales taxes to deal
with the fiscal crisis of the Great Depression. See id. at 610.
54. PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 10:1
(1981).
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different transactions and for different opportunities afforded by a
State., 55 The practical effect of this constitutional difference is that a re-
tailer can only be required to collect the sales tax in the jurisdiction
where the sale occurs, with the corollary that sales made outside of a
state are not subject to the sales tax. However, if a state enacts a use tax
and all jurisdictions that have a sales tax have enacted a complementary
use tax, then that same retailer that is not required to collect the sales tax
can be required to collect the use tax on the out-of-state sale when it is
delivered to an in-state resident.56 Justice Douglas's dissent in McLeod
rejected this form-over-substance argument noting the following:
A use tax and a sales tax applied at the very end of an interstate
transaction have precisely the same economic incidence. Their ef-
fect on interstate commerce is identical .... I can see no warrant for
an interpretation of the Commerce Clause which puts local industry
at a competitive disadvantage with interstate business. If there is a
taxable event within the State of the buyer, I would make the result
under the Commerce Clause turn on practical considerations and
business realities rather than on dialectics. 57
While it is true that an in-state retailer can be required to collect the
sales tax and the use tax, the same is not true for out-of-state retailers that
do not fall within the regulatory tax jurisdiction of the states where they
send their merchandise. 58 To avoid the problem of unfair tax treat-
ment 59-unfair in the sense that people who purchase their items in the
55. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1944).
56. "The conclusion is inescapable: equal treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers
similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state."
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reiley, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963).
57. McLeod, 322 U.S. at 333-35.
58. The out-of-state retailers not collecting the use tax are not only small businesses: they
include large well-known companies such as Amazon.com; Coldwater Creek Inc.; DAMARK Inter-
national, Inc.; Dell Catalog Sales, L.P.; Fingerhut Companies, Inc.; L.L. Bean, Inc.; and
Spiegel.com. MI-1040 MICHIGAN INCOME TAX RETURN 5 (2000), http://www.michigan.gov
/documents/m 1040f 2724_7.pdf.
59. In upholding the constitutionality of the use tax, Justice Cardozo explained:
Equality is the theme that runs through all the sections of the statute. There shall be a tax
upon the use, but subject to an offset if another use or sales tax has been paid for the same
thing. This is true where the offsetting tax became payable to Washington by reason of
purchase or use within the state. It is true in exactly the same measure where the offset-
ting tax has been paid to another state by reason of use or purchase there. No one who
uses property in Washington after buying it at retail is to be exempt from a tax upon the
privilege of enjoyment except to the extent that he has paid a use or sales tax somewhere.
Every one who has paid a use or sales tax anywhere, or, more accurately, in any state, is
to that extent to be exempt from the payment of another tax in Washington.
When the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no greater burdens
as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates. The one pays upon one
activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum is the same when the reckon-
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state pay the tax while others who have the item shipped from another
state pay no tax-states require consumers to self-assess the use tax.
60
Though states provide several mechanisms for residents to self-assess
their use tax, such as use tax forms, 61 line-items on state personal net in-
come tax forms, 62 and recently web-based on-line filing forms, 63 most
ing is closed. Equality exists when the chattel subjected to the use tax is bought in an-
other state and then carried into Washington. It exists when the imported chattel is
shipped from the state of origin under an order received directly from the state of destina-
tion. In each situation the burden borne by the owner is balanced by an equal burden
where the sale is strictly local. "There is no demand in [the] Constitution that the state
shall put its requirements in any one statute. It may distribute them as it sees fit, if the re-
sult, taken in its totality, is within the state's constitutional power." If the sales tax were
abolished, the buyer in Washington would pay at once upon the use. He would have no
longer an offsetting credit. While the sales tax is in force, he pays upon the sale, and pays
at the same rate. For the owner who uses after buying from afar the effect is all one
whether his competitor is taxable under one title or another.
Henneford v. Silas Mason, 300 U.S. 577, 583-84 (1937) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
60. For example, Virginia law provides the following:
There is hereby levied and imposed, in addition to all other taxes and fees now imposed
by law, a tax upon the use or consumption of tangible personal property in this Com-
monwealth, or the storage of such property outside the Commonwealth for use or con-
sumption in this Commonwealth, in the amount of three and one-half percent ....
1. Of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property used or consumed
in this Commonwealth. Tangible personal property which has been acquired for use out-
side this Commonwealth and subsequently becomes subject to the tax imposed hereunder
shall be taxed on the basis of its cost price if such property is brought within this Com-
monwealth for use within six months of its acquisition; but if so brought within this
Commonwealth six months or more after its acquisition, such property shall be taxed on
the basis of the current market value (but not in excess of its cost price) of such property
at the time of its first use within this Commonwealth. Such tax shall be based on such
proportion of the cost price or current market value as the duration of time of use within
this Commonwealth bears to the total useful life of such property (but it shall be pre-
sumed in all cases that such property will remain within this Commonwealth for the re-
mainder of its useful life unless convincing evidence is provided to the contrary).
2. Of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property stored outside
this Commonwealth for use or consumption in this Commonwealth.
3. A transaction taxed under § 58.1-603 shall not also be taxed under this section, nor
shall the same transaction be taxed more than once under either section.
4. The use tax shall not apply with respect to the use of any article of tangible personal
property brought into this Commonwealth by a nonresident individual, visiting in Vir-
ginia, for his personal use, while within this Commonwealth.
5. The use tax shall not apply to out-of-state mail order catalog purchases totaling $100 or
less during any calendar year.
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-604 (2004).
61. See, e.g., MARYLAND TAX FORM COMIST- I118A, CONSUMER USE TAX RETURN FOR OUT-
OF-STATE PURCHASES, http://forms.marylandtaxes.com/current-forms/usetax.pdf (last visited Mar.
7, 2006). Maryland requires quarterly filing for out-of-state purchases, many states require yearly
filing, and some states require monthly filing.
62. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §1861-A (West, Westlaw through 2005 Special
Second Sess.) ("The assessor shall provide that individuals report use tax on items with a purchase
price of $5,000 or less on their Maine individual income tax returns.").
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consumers either are unfamiliar with the use tax,64 misunderstand its ap-
plication, 65 or choose not to self-assess their use tax liability. 66 Unfortu-
nately,
[c]ollecting the use tax from the purchaser, particularly where the
purchaser is an individual, is often inefficient and not cost-effective.
This is especially so because many consumers do not realize they
are subject to the use tax. One possible solution is to require the out-
of-state vendor to collect the tax from the purchaser and remit it to
the taxing state. However, requiring an out-of-state vendor to collect
the use tax from the in-state purchaser and remit it to the taxing
state presents constitutional problems.67
Because use tax self-assessment has not been very successful 68 -
small movable items have been difficult for states to track69 while a few
63. See, e.g., Tennessee Department of Revenue, http://www.tennesseeanytime.org/usetax/
(last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
64. "'The use tax is one of the most misunderstood and most unknown [taxes] out there,' said
Vic Anderson, a supervisor in the audit division of the state Board of Equalization, which oversees
the tax." Verne Kopytoff, Pay Up, State Says, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 2004, at B1.
65. The passage of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998),
has caused some confusion with the public, creating the perception that Internet sales are tax free
when they are not. The Act prohibited discriminatory treatment (already prohibited by the Court's
Negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence), Internet access charges, and new taxes on the Internet. A
new tax might include something like a "bit tax," whereby each "bit" of transferred information
would be taxed. At the time of the enactment of the Act, some feared that states would pass a "bit
tax," though there is no evidence that any state ever considered such a tax. In any event, sales and
use taxes are not new taxes, as they were enacted in many states in the 1930s.
66. As of the year 2000, the population of the State of Michigan was 9,938,444. U.S. Census
Bureau, Michigan QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26000.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2006). Of this number, 72,872 self-assessed their use tax on their Michigan income tax return in
2002, with the state losing an estimated $188 million in use tax revenues in fiscal year 2002 (esti-
mated to rise to $248 million in fiscal year 2005) from consumers that did not self-assess their use
tax on their remote purchases. OFFICE OF REVENUE AND TAX ANALYSIS, MICH. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, MICHIGAN'S SALES AND USE TAXES 2002, at 6 (2002), http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/SalesUseTaxReport June 2003_69162_7.pdf. However, Michigan's revenue loss esti-
mate may be too conservative. Two University of Tennessee professors reported that Michigan's
revenue loss in 2001 was $502.9 million with nationwide revenue losses in 2001 reaching $13 bil-
lion, and rising to $54 billion by 2011. States would need to raise their sales tax rates by between
0.46 and 0.94 percentage points to replace the lost revenue. DONALD BRUCE AND WILLIAM Fox,
STATE AND LOCAL SALES TAX REVENUE LOSSES FROM E-COMMERCE: UPDATED ESTIMATES 13
(2001), http://cber.bus.utk.edu/ecomm/ecom090l.pdf.
67. Saba Ashraf, Virtual Taxation: State Taxation of Internet and On-Line Sales, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 605, 611 (1997).
68. California recently added a use tax self-assessment line on the California personal income
tax return, though they only expect to collect $13 million of the $1.2 billion they are losing annually.
Kopytoff, supra note 64. The difficulty in getting consumers to self-assess a use tax may be over-
come by more stringent penalties for failure to comply with the law or perhaps better education
about the responsibilities of citizens concerning sales and use tax would promote greater compliance.
In either case, a state is certainly free to attempt to do what is easier for the state and the consumer
by attempting to assess the tax against businesses selling goods in the state.
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larger, more expensive items have been easier to track 7 -the rest of the
Article will discuss the constitutional impediments to requiring out-of-
state vendors to collect the use tax.71
Use tax collection is extremely important to businesses because
once a business comes under a state's use tax collection authority, that
business must remit the tax, even if it failed to do so at the time of the
sale.72 In practice, a business that guesses wrong on the nexus question
will have to absorb the entire tax itself7 3 since it is not likely to be willing
to go back to its customers and recoup the tax, especially for inexpensive
items.74 Also, if the business cannot pay the use tax assessment, then
69. People purchase small movable items all the time that elude detection by state taxing au-
thorities. For example, a person can buy an expensive $10,000 watch in a state, like Delaware, that
does not have a sales tax, and take it back to his home state where the use tax is never self-assessed.
Also, a person might purchase an expensive piece of artwork in one state and then have it shipped to
his home in another state, where once again the tax is not self-assessed. In addition to these more
expensive items, small-ticket items present their own difficulties. The low purchase price associated
with many sales from direct mail-order catalog and internet retailers makes it impracticable for the
state to collect the tax.
70. The states have been extremely successful in collecting the sales and use tax on certain
expensive items. Automobiles are relatively easy to track because of their unique vehicle identifica-
tion numbers and the requirement that they be registered with the state department of motor vehicles.
The Federal Aviation Administration has similar registration requirements for airplanes that states
can obtain, and many states require boat owners to register their boats with state regulatory agencies.
71. Recently the Hawaii Supreme Court challenged sixty years of United States Supreme Court
precedent that started with McLeod, and held that its general excise tax could be imposed for sales
that occurred outside of Hawaii and that Hawaii's complementary use tax was not applicable. Baker
& Taylor, Inc. v. Kawafuchi, 82 P.3d 804 (Haw. 2004). The Hawaii Court explained that the older
case law "was decided at a time when the Supreme Court had held that state taxes on interstate
commerce were per se unconstitutional." Id. at 815. Moreover,
The only physical presence involved in McLeod was solicitation by sales people who
were domiciled in another state. Baker's situation, on the other hand, did not involve
mere solicitation and a sale that was final as the goods were transferred to a common car-
rier. Baker was involved with an ongoing, long-term contract ... that required sales rep-
resentatives to frequently meet with the [in-state purchaser] to discuss the quality of book
delivery and to provide training for the software that Baker allowed the [in-state pur-
chaser] to use to catalog books after the sales.
Id. Because Hawaii is exerting its excise tax on an out-of-state seller with significant physical con-
tacts in the state, this case may mark the beginning of the end for McLeodand its progeny-a victory
for substance over form. In another sense, however, this case represents a Pyrrhic victory because
Hawaii maintains in-state physical presence as the jurisdictional standard for its general excise tax.
To paraphrase that famous line from Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet: What's in a name? That
which we call a tax by any other name would still be a tax.
72. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 28, § 19.03.
73. Id.
74. It would be impracticable for a large company with mail-order sales in a state to send let-
ters to their customers requesting a few dollars in use tax-the administrative costs would be pro-
hibitive and the company would risk antagonizing customers. It is current practice by some mail-
order companies that collect the use tax to absorb the use tax in situations where the consumer fills
out an order form, fails to include the required tax, and then pays by check.
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corporate officers and responsible employees may be held personally
liable for the tax.75
B. State Tax Jurisdiction
The Constitution limits states' ability to compel businesses selling
goods in interstate commerce to collect sales and use taxes.7 6 For the first
time in its tortured state tax jurisdiction history, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly held in Quill that the Due Process and Commerce Clauses have
differing purposes and that the nexus requirements are "not identical. 77
Intellectually this is obvious, but practically it has revolutionized the
field and increased litigation.
1. Due Process Clause
The purpose of due process is to ensure the "fairness of governmen-
tal activity." 78 To implement this, the Supreme Court requires sufficient
contacts with a state to make it fair for the state to exercise power over
an out-of-state person.79 Contacts are sufficient when a person has"minimum contacts" with the state so that "the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."' 80 The Court has also held that as "long as a commercial actor's
efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State, we
have consistently rejected the notion that absence of physical contacts
can defeat personal jurisdiction there." 81 Quill reaffirmed the latter
proposition, that the "requirements of due process are met irrespective of
a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State." 82
75. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 28, § 19.06[2].
76. See generally id. § 19.02.
77. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
81. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). The Supreme Court held that
the District Court's exercise ofjurisdiction pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause since Rudzewicz established a substantial and con-
tinuing relationship with Burger King's Miami headquarters even though he did not physically enter
the forum. Id. at 487. His actions were sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction because prior
negotiations, contemplated future consequences, the terms of the contract, and his actual course of
dealing amounted to the purposeful availment and foreseeability required for "minimum contacts"
under International Shoe and its progeny. Id. at 479.
82. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
[Vol. 29:581
2006]
2. Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to pro-
hibit state actions that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate
commerce as part of its Negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.83 A
state's attempt to tax out-of-state companies may be seen as such a bur-
den if, among other things,84 the tax is applied to a company that does
not have "substantial nexus" with the taxing state. Expressly rejecting a
facts-and-circumstances test, which would have weighed various factors,
the Quill Court instead created a simple bright-line test measured by
physical presence in a state.8 6 The Quill Court held that the physical
presence of a company in the taxing state satisfies the Commerce Clause
substantial nexus test.87 Unfortunately, lower courts have found some
ambiguity in Quill, and have struggled to apply the bright-line to the
facts of real cases.88
Admittedly, part of the confusion lies in the name given to the legal
requirement by the Quill Court: "substantial nexus." The word "substan-
tial" connotes weighing of factors, yet the Court attached a bright-line
test to the legal phrase "substantial nexus." Thus, we have a legal re-
quirement that requires a company to have substantial nexus with a state
before it can be subjected to a state's regulatory use tax authority, but
83. Id. at 312.
84. All state taxes must meet three additional requirements to satisfy the Negative Commerce
Clause: the tax must be one that is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and is fairly related to the service provided by the state. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
85. See id. The wording of the Complete Auto test may indicate that courts should examine the
particular transaction's connection to the state ("transaction nexus"), but this notion was repudiated
by the Supreme Court in National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551 (1977), where it upheld "entity nexus" as the correct inquiry. Id. at 562. The facts of that case
provide an example of entity nexus: the company, which maintained offices in the taxing state for
purposes other than the sale of products to the state's residents, was found to satisfy the substantial
nexus test via the unrelated in-state entities.
86. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
87. Id. (reaffirming Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)). A mail-order
only business is characterized as a business that solicits the residents of the taxing state through U.S.
mail or common carrier, receives and accepts orders outside of the taxing state, and delivers the
product through U.S. mail or common carrier from outside the state. The business has no physical
presence in and does not itself visit the state. Id. at 311 (citing Nat'l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758).
88. See In re Laptops Etc. Corp., 164 B.R. 506, 521 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993) ("The boundaries of
what range of commercial activity constitutes a 'physical presence' for purposes of the 'substantial
nexus' requirement of the Commerce Clause are not drawn with precision."); Brown's Furniture,
Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795, 802 (Ill. 1996) ("Left unclear after Quill, however, is the extent of
physical presence in a state needed to establish more than a 'slight' physical presence."); see also
Matthew T. Troyer, Mail Order Retailers and Commerce Clause Nexus: A Bright Line Rule or an
Opaque Standard?, 30 IND. L. REV. 881, 883 (1997) (discussing the gray area between no physical
presence in a state and maintaining continuous operations).
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that legal requirement is determined by a bright-line physical presence
test.
This lack of clarity by the Court is not new. Before Quill, the Court
referred to the "substantial nexus '' 89 requirement alternatively as "suffi-
cient nexus," 90 "sufficiently connected," 91 "requisite nexus, 92 "necessary
basis, ' 93 "sufficient relation,, 94 "necessary nexus," 95 "adequate nexus,"96"obvious nexus," 97 "clear and sufficient nexus, ' ' 98 and Chief Justice
Rehnquist's colorful phrase "nexus aplenty." 99 However, even after
Quill-the seminal nexus case of the last twenty-five years-the Court
has continued describing the "substantial nexus" requirement in different
ways, such as "adequate nexus,"' 00 "sufficient nexus,"'' "Commerce
Clause nexus, ' 0 2 "nexus aplenty"'0 3 (this phrase is apparently just too
good for the Justices to let go), and, in one of its most recent state tax
cases, "minimal connection."' 04 These interchangeable phrases suggest
that the phrase "substantial nexus" in Quill is the Court's shorthand for
Commerce Clause nexus-any substantive meaning of the phrase must
be found in the case law and not in the phrase "substantial nexus" it-
self. 'O
The Quill Court likewise lacks clarity when it describes the due
process minimum contacts test: "due process nexus analysis requires that
we ask whether an individual's connections with a State are substantial
enough to legitimate the State's exercise of power over him."' 0 6 It is cu-
rious that the Court describes the due process minimum contacts test as
requiring substantial contacts; 10 7 a threshold that is easily met by most
companies doing business across state lines. Since the Court spent so
89. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
90. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
91. Id.
92. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977).
93. Id. at 557.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 558.
96. Id. at 562.
97. Dep't of Revenue. v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978).
98. Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 225 (1980).
99. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988).
100. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 330 (1994).
101. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 464 (2000).
105. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,313-18 (1992).
106. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
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much time explaining that there are two separate nexus tests, it would be
odd for the Court to then define them similarly.
Examining the legal definition of "substantial" provides some light
as to what the Court meant by "substantial nexus" in Quill. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "substantial" as "[b]elonging to substance; actually
existing; real; not seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true; verita-
ble.' 0° This legal definition furnishes evidence that "substantial" is de-
fined qualitatively, not quantitatively. Webster's Dictionary also lends
support to the qualitative nature of the word by defining its primary
meaning as "consisting of or relating to substance; not imaginary or illu-
sory: real, true; important, essential,"' 1 9 while the notion of "substantial"
as quantitative is relegated to a secondary meaning of the word. 0
Though the phrase "substantial nexus" is amorphous, Quill does at-
tempt to provide guidance for Commerce Clause nexus by providing a
test that examines qualitative contacts that do and do not create nexus
(i.e., the bright-line physical presence test). Specifically, the Quill Court
eliminates any room for quantitative nexus speculation because its
bright-line test "firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state au-
thority."' 11 A "substantial nexus" test that looks primarily at the quantity
of contacts ignores both the bright-line test as well as the Court's explicit
rejection of "tests with more contextual balancing inquiries. '12 The
Court was aware that it could have established a facts-and-circumstances
test (i.e., a test where the number of contacts is weighed); however, the
Court refused to do so after extensive discussion of the topic. " 3 A bright-
line test is "artificial at its edges . . . [however] this artificiality . . . is
more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule." '" 4 If a business has con-
tacts that fall on one side of the state line they have nexus, while if their
contacts are on the other side of the state line there is no nexus. This is a
simple and clear rule that does not take into account factors like the
number of contacts or the type of contact (e.g., solicitation, technical
support, or training).
Given the history and context of the phrases used by the Court to
describe Commerce Clause nexus, it is useless to try to discern any sub-
stantive meaning from the phrases "substantial nexus," "sufficient
nexus," or "nexus aplenty" themselves. Should state tax jurisdiction de-
bates be relegated to a tit-for-tat where those that want to avoid nexus
108. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (5th ed. 1979).
109. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1153 (1981).
110. Id.
I111. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
112. Id. at 316.
113. Id. at 316-17.
114. Id. at 315.
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use the phrase "substantial nexus" while those wanting to create nexus
rely on the phrases "sufficient nexus" or "minimal contacts?" Only mod-
em-day sophists 15 would seriously contend that such debate would be
useful.1 16 In the end it is case law that animates the concept of Commerce
Clause nexus; out-of-context discussions on "substantial nexus" border
on the frivolous and are shibboleths. The poet, admittedly taken out of
context, nevertheless captures this debate best:
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 117
So what kind of physical presence creates substantial nexus?
"Whether or not a State may compel a vendor to collect sales or use taxes
may turn on the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant,
or office.' ' 18 Moreover, the Court has rejected form-over-substance ar-
guments and held that a part-time, non-exclusive, independent contractor
can provide the necessary physical presence within a state to bring the
foreign company into the state's use tax jurisdiction.1 19
115. The following is a brief description of sophists:
The most popular career of a Greek of ability [in the 5th Century B.C.] was politics;
hence the sophists largely concentrated on teaching rhetoric. The aims of the young poli-
ticians whom they trained were to persuade the multitude of whatever they wished them
to believe. The search for truth was not top priority. Consequently the sophists undertook
to provide a stock of arguments on any subject, or to prove any position. They boasted of
their ability to make the worse appear the better reason, to prove that black is white.
Some, like Gorgias, asserted that it was not necessary to have any knowledge of a subject
to give satisfactory replies as regards [to] it. Thus, Gorgias ostentatiously answered any
question on any subject instantly and without consideration. To attain these ends mere
quibbling, and the scoring of verbal points were employed. In this way, the sophists tried
to entangle, entrap, and confuse their opponents, and even, if this were not possible, to
beat them down by mere violence and noise. They sought also to dazzle by means of
strange or flowery metaphors, by unusual figures of speech, by epigrams and paradoxes,
and in general by being clever and smart, rather than earnest and truthful. Hence our
word "sophistry": the use of fallacious arguments knowing them to be such.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sophists, http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/sophists.htm (last
visited Mar. 13, 2006).
116. Looking for substantive differences between these two phrases is reminiscent of the war
between Lilliput and Blefuscu over the proper side of an egg to break-the larger end or the smaller
end. Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels, in 34 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 3, 22
(Mortimer J. Adler ed., Encyclopedia Britannica 2d ed. 1990) (1726).
117. Matthew Arnold, Dover Beach, in A VICTORIAN ANTHOLOGY 226, 226 (Edmund C.
Stedman, ed. 1895) (1867).
118. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (citations omitted).
119. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1960):
True, the 'salesmen' are not regular employees of appellant devoting full time to its ser-
vice, but we conclude that such a fine distinction is without constitutional significance.
The formal shift in the contractual tagging of the salesman as 'independent' neither re-
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Imagine a nexus continuum with a bright-line in the center. On the
far reaches of the continuum, courts have had no problems dealing with
the nexus question: on one end, a company that engages in business
solely through mail-order catalogs has no nexus with a state, while on the
other end a company with a manufacturing facility in a state has nexus.
120
But how should courts approach situations where a company has only
temporary physical presence in the state, as where a corporate salesper-
son enters a state for three days, or where a corporation holds title to tan-
gible personal property in a state for two weeks? It is the cases near the
bright-line, at the center of the continuum, where courts grapple with
nexus even though Quill equated any physical presence with substantial
nexus.
Adjectives like "some,". "enough," "sufficient," and "substantial"
obfuscate the bright-line physical presence test. For purposes of closer
examination, consider two possible types of physical presence: some or
any. Some physical presence in a state might include an occasional trip
by a salesperson or the delivery of tangible personal property in a com-
pany-owned truck. But once a court accepts that Quill requires "some"
physical presence, that court immediately transforms the bright-line test
into a facts-and-circumstances test. The only physical presence test that
maintains fidelity to a bright-line test-certainly from an internally con-
sistent perspective-is one that looks for "any" physical presence in the
taxing state rather than "some" physical presence.
The Quill test may appear harsh when applied near the edges of the
bright-line, but that is the nature of any bright-line test. Congress can
change the test if it chooses. 12 1 Under the Court's Negative Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, this is a judicially-created test that the courts, ulti-
mately, do not control. 122
suits in changing his local function of solicitation nor bears upon its effectiveness in se-
curing a substantial flow of goods into Florida.
Id.
120. Compare Quill, 504 U.S. at 311, with Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386
U.S. 753 (1967).
121. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
122. The Constitution grants Congress the right to regulate interstate commerce, thus any judi-
cially created doctrine can be overturned at any time by federal legislation.
In 1883 the Court stated in Parkersburg & Ohio River Transp. Co. v. City of Parkersburg,
107 U.S. 691, 701 (1882), "It is the congress, and not the judicial department to which
the constitution has given the power to regulate commerce . . . among the several states."
And in the same case it was made clear that "[i]naction by Congress" with respect to its
regulatory powers "is not to be taken as a declaration that nothing shall be done with re-
spect to them, but is rather to be deemed a declaration that for the time being, and until it
(Congress) sees fit to act, they may be regulated by state authority." (Word in parentheses
ours).
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 164 So. 2d 314, 319 (La. 1964).
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[T]he underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better
qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate
power to resolve . . . . Congress is now free to decide whether,
when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-
order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes. l2 3
Until that day arrives, the test is what the Court says it is: the
Commerce Clause nexus test is satisfied with any physical presence in a
state. 1 4 Fairness considerations play no part in the Quill Commerce
Clause test. 125
3. Interrelationship Between the Two Nexus Tests
The Article so far has examined, separately, Quill's Due Process
and Commerce Clause nexus tests that determine whether a state has
sales and use tax jurisdiction. 26 However, both tests need to be examined
jointly, as Quill made clear that the Due Process and Commerce Clauses
are both implicated in state tax cases involving out-of-state sellers. 27
While rejecting the physical presence requirement for Due Process (thus
following the line of cases from International Shoe128), Quill retained a
physical presence requirement for the Commerce Clause as applied to
123. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
124. Id. at 315.
Whether or not a State may compel a vendor to collect a sales or use tax may turn on the
presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office .... This artificiality,
however, is more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule. Such a rule firmly establishes
the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes
and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.
Id.
125. Id. at 305.
126. Though this Article does not distinguish between constitutional nexus standards applica-
ble to sales and use taxes, the standard for the sales tax is different from that of the use tax. "It has
long been settled that a sale of tangible goods has a sufficient nexus to the State in which the sale is
consummated to be treated as a local transaction taxable by that State." Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jef-
ferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995). Thus, if an out-of-state company ships its goods into a
state in a manner where the sale is deemed to occur in that state (e.g., F.O.B. place of destination),
then that out-of-state retailer can be required to collect the sales tax. Since the Uniform Commercial
Code allows for a seller to decide where a sale occurs, this is a trap for the unwary draftsman that
chooses F.O.B. place of delivery (sale occurs in state of destination) versus F.O.B. place of shipment
(sale occurs in state of origin). U.C.C. § 2-319 (1998). However, the Court's sales tax jurisprudence
in cases like Jefferson Lines has involved companies with physical presence in the state-there are
no sales tax nexus decisions by the Court decided solely on the legal distinctions between shipment
and destination found in the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175.
"As neither Bellas Hess nor Quill considers a sales tax, their holdings are limited to the imposition
of a use tax collection duty and do not state what nexus rules apply to a sales tax on a sale in a cross-
border transaction." Paull Mines, Conversing with Professor Hellerstein: Electronic Commerce and
Nexus Propel Sales and Use Tax Reform, 52 TAX L. REV. 581, 589 (1997).
127. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.
128. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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sales and use taxes. The Supreme Court described the difference as fol-
lows:
The "substantial nexus" requirement is not, like due process'"minimum contacts" requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a
means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce. Accord-
ingly ... a corporation may have the "minimum contacts" with a
taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the"substantial nexus" with the State as required by the Commerce
Clause. 129
That is, a "tax may be consistent with due process and yet unduly burden
interstate commerce." 130 Because the Due Process Clause has a different
threshold than does the Commerce Clause, due process may be satisfied
even without physical presence.' 31 Indeed, in most of the cases involving
constitutional limitations on sales and use taxes, due process is almost
never contested. 132
In post-Quill reported cases, it is relatively easy to satisfy the Due
Process Clause minimum contacts test because state revenue agencies
focus on out-of-state companies that regularly and systematically take
advantage of their state's market.' 33 Invariably, if the Commerce Clause
is considered first when looking for tax nexus, the subsequent considera-
tion of the Due Process Clause is unnecessary. This is because if a com-
pany meets the Commerce Clause nexus standard, it is axiomatic that it
meets the Due Process Clause; 134 if the company fails to meet the Com-
merce Clause nexus standard, any taxation on it is unconstitutional and
any Due Process Clause analysis is extraneous. 135
129. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
130. Id. at 313 n.7.
131. Id. at 307 ("[I]f a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an eco-
nomic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State's in personam jurisdiction even if
it has no physical presence in the State.").
132. See, e.g., In re Family of Eagles, Ltd., 66 P.3d 858, 863 (Kan. 2000) ("[taxpayer] does not
assert a due process claim"); In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d 11 11, 1113 (Kan. 2000) ("nei-
ther party had argued or briefed the issue"); Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Share Int'l, Inc., 676 So. 2d
1362 (Fla. 1996) (due process not mentioned); Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795,
802 (Il1. 1996) (no due process analysis applied); Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654 N.E. 2d
954 (N.Y. 1995) (no due process analysis applied).
133. State revenue agencies are likely to use their scarce litigation resources to bring compa-
nies with significant sales in the state into compliance, rather than litigate cases at the margin with
questionable due process nexus.
134. See, e.g., Town Crier v. Dep't. of Revenue, 733 N.E.2d 780, 787 (111. 2000); see also
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (transient physical presence in a state satisfies
the Due Process Clause).
135. See, e.g., MCI Int'l Telecomm. Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-96-0028-01,
at II n.8 (Md. Tax Ct. Apr. 26, 1999), available at http://www.txcrt.state.md.us/pubs/pdf/MCIIT
.pdf.
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Town Crier made clear that a company with Commerce Clause
nexus will also have Due Process Clause nexus:
Since we have already determined that the use tax assessed against
plaintiff passes contemporary commerce clause scrutiny, we could
also find that it is a foregone conclusion that the assessment satis-
fied due process scrutiny as well .... Thus, we could decide that,
because there exists a substantial nexus for commerce clause pur-
poses, there is no question that the requirements of the due process
clause have also been satisfied. However, employing the analysis
suggested in Quill, we will address separately why the limitations
imposed by the due process clause have also been satisfied.136
The whole point of Quill was to distinguish and separate the nexus tests
of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses; however, the lower courts
have unfortunately merged the two tests into one test, as seen in Town
Crier. '3 7
The interrelationship of contacts considered under both the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses is nicely illustrated by Town Crier:
The record in this case shows that plaintiff had at least some mini-
mum connection with Illinois during the audit period. By making 30
deliveries into Illinois in its own vehicles and installing blinds or
shades in Illinois on five occasions, plaintiff exploited Illinois' con-
sumer furniture market. Plaintiffs success in this effort is illustrated
by the fact that, during the sampling period, more than half of plain-
tiffs gross sales constituted sales of merchandise delivered into Illi-
nois. Plaintiffs extensive sales of items delivered into Illinois, cou-
pled with its regular physical presence here, provide sufficient
grounds for concluding that plaintiff has successfully availed itself
of Illinois' consumer markets.' 38
The court had commented earlier that "by making deliveries into Illinois
in its own vehicles, plaintiff ha[d] established a regular presence in Illi-
nois that enhanced its ability to establish and maintain a market for its
furniture sales."' 139 Town Crier thus reflects the nature of contacts con-
sidered under both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. Under the
Due Process Clause, all contacts are taken into account. This holistic
view stems from the Supreme Court's interpretation that simple "pur-
poseful availment" (or any attempt to solicit sales from residents of an-
other state) will suffice to satisfy due process.140 Juxtapose this, however,
136. Town Crier, 733 N.E.2d at 787 (emphasis added).
137. See id
138. Id. at 788.
139. Id. at 787.
140. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
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with the contacts considered under the Commerce Clause-because
physical presence is a requirement of substantial nexus, courts tend to
focus their time and analysis on that aspect.' 4'
Once fairness is taken out of the Commerce Clause and placed
rightfully back into due process analysis, a corresponding shift in the
types of contacts considered will occur. Generally, fairness has been in-
voked in an analysis that considered only physical contacts. Placing fair-
ness back into a Due Process Clause inquiry will allow for a more logical
discussion as to whether it would be fair to impose a use tax collection
obligation on a business, based on all of its contacts with a state.
4. Quill Footnote Eight Loophole
One lingering issue that needs to be addressed is footnote eight in
Quill,142 which creates a seeming loophole that blurs the bright-line test.
At first glance, this footnote appears to say that "some" physical pres-
ence is allowed in a state without creating nexus, and some commenta-
tors maintain that this is an accurate reading. 143 The footnote reads:
In addition to its common carrier contacts with the State, Quill also
licensed software to some of its North Dakota clients. The State"concedes that the existence in North Dakota of a few floppy disk-
ettes to which Quill holds title seems a slender thread upon which to
base nexus." We agree. Although title to "a few floppy diskettes"
present in a State might constitute some minimal nexus, in National
Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization, we expressly
rejected a "slightest presence" standard of constitutional nexus. We
therefore conclude that Quill's licensing of software in this case
does not meet the "substantial nexus" requirement of the Commerce
Clause. 144
However, making much of a footnote is itself problematic, given that the
Court frowns on jurisprudence by footnote. 45 On the other hand, the text
141. See, e.g., In re Family of Eagles, Ltd., 66 P.3d 858 (Kan. 2003).
142. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 n.8 (1992).
143. See, e.g., Jeff Nemerofsky, Sleepless Over the Hotel Tax, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527, 532-33
(2001).
The Quill holding, however, also affirmed that a " slight" or "de minimis" connection
would not be enough to establish a substantial nexus within the taxing state. The "bright-
line" physical presence test definitively answered the question of who cannot be taxed,
but left somewhat open the question of who may be taxed. Thus, Quill leaves us with "the
vagaries" of determining just how much of a presence is needed.
Id. (emphasis in original).
144. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8.
145. The Court is disdainful of arguments made solely from footnotes, especially when a foot-
note counters clear precedent. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 538 (2000) (refusing to overturn
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in the footnote raises a plausible objection to the analysis presented in
this Article, and therefore should be addressed.
There are two issues raised by this footnote. First, can an out-of-
state company own floppy diskettes in a state without creating nexus
with that state? Second, does the Court recognize a test called the"slightest presence" test?
As to the first issue, the confusion stems from the Court's reference
to "a few floppy diskettes," which are clearly tangible personal prop-
erty. 146 Logically, if a company could own some tangible personal prop-
erty in a state without having a nexus with that state, then the bright-line
test is obliterated. The test becomes one for determining if "some" physi-
cal presence is enough to create nexus, or if "any" physical presence is
all that matters.
Although it is hard to imagine that the Court gave much thought to
the wording of footnote eight, the footnote itself provides the key to un-
raveling this logical dilemma. The first sentence of the footnote explains
that "licensed software" is the contact being examined, and the last sen-
tence of the footnote concludes that "Quill's licensing of software in this
case does not meet the 'substantial nexus' requirement of the Commerce
Clause."' 147 Thus, the Court's focus was on the intangible property-the
licensed software located in North Dakota-not on the diskettes, the tan-
gible personal property that delivered the licensed software. Quill con-
ceded this fact when it told the Court the following:
The Record does not support North Dakota's contention that Quill"retains title" to [the software program] while the diskettes are in
the customer's possession or that Quill retains any physical control
over [the software program] or the diskette after sale or gift of the
diskette to the customer. The intangible right that Quill has under
the software agreement to terminate access for inappropriate use of
the program is distinct from the customer's ownership and use of
precedent based on language in footnotes); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 822 (2000) (discount-
ing support cited by Respondent that was mentioned only briefly in a footnote).
146. Tangible personal property is defined as "[c]orporeal personal property of any kind; per-
sonal property that can be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched, or is in any other way percepti-
ble to the senses, such as furniture, cooking utensils, and books." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1254
(8th ed. 2004). In contrast, intangible property is "[p]roperty that lacks a physical existence. Exam-
ples include stock options and business goodwill." Id. at 1253.
While all agree that a floppy disk is tangible (i.e., can be touched), lower courts are split as to
whether electronic information is tangible or intangible. Compare Fl. Dep't of Revenue v. Quotron
Sys., 615 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) (delivery of electronic information not tangible personal
property), and In re AT&T Techs., Inc., 749 P.2d 1033 (Kan. 1988) (application software intangible
personal property), with S. Cent. Bell Tel. v. Barthelemy, 643 So. 2d 1240 (La. 1994) (software
tangible personal property because it is recorded in physical form and has physical existence on
tapes, disks, or hard drives).
147. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8 (emphasis added).
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[the software program]. That intangible right is indistinguishable
from the protections offered under trademark, trade name, copyright
and patent laws .... Any right that Quill has under the software
agreement has no connection with North Dakota. 148
Interestingly, the Court did not repudiate the possibility that intan-
gible property located in a state might meet the physical presence test,1 49
but rather noted that the test was not met "in this case."' 5 ° In all likeli-
hood, the Court did not address the issue of whether the use of intangible
property can create a sufficient nexus because of the evidence in Quill
itself: "Quill sold or gave [the software program] to six customers in
North Dakota, only one of whom has ever used it to order merchandise
from Quill."15' The use of one diskette by one customer is rather weak
grounds for extending the definition of nexus to include intangible prop-
erty, especially for such a minor legal issue. Though whether intellectual
property can constitute physical presence in a state has yet to be decided
by the United States Supreme Court, 152 at least one lower court has found
that intellectual property can create sufficient nexus for sales and use tax
purposes. 53
The second issue created by footnote eight is the statement by the
Court that the diskettes might create some "minimal nexus" in conjunc-
tion with the Court's "express[] reject[ion of] a 'slightest presence' stan-
dard of constitutional nexus. 154 Prior to Quill, the Court decided Na-
tional Geographic, which upheld California's ability to require an out-of-
148. Reply Brief for Respondent at 15, Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (No. 91-194).
149. "A remote seller's interest in an intangible (software) can supply a sufficient relationship
to support a finding of nexus for the imposition of a sales tax or a use tax collection duty." Paull
Mines, Conversing with Professor Hellerstein: Electronic Commerce and Nexus Propel Sales and
Use Tax Reform, 52 TAx L. REV. 581, 607 (1997).
150. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8.
151. Reply Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at 15.
152. Contra Quill, 504 U.S. at 331 n.3 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Instead of remanding for consideration of whether Quill's ownership of software constitutes suffi-
cient physical presence under its new Commerce Clause nexus requirement, the majority concludes
as a matter of law that it does not.").
153. See Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't., No. 21,140 (N.M. Ct. App., Nov.
27, 2001) ("Being intangible property, a trademark can only have 'physical presence,' beyond the
state of its creation, in those locales where it is put to tangible use."); see also Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C.
Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 17-18 (S.C. 1993). When Kmart Corporation uses Kmart Properties
Incorporated's marks in a highly visible and commercially purposeful fashion in New Mexico, it
logically follows that those marks are physically present during their period of use, otherwise,
trademarks could never be physically present anywhere other than where the taxpayer designates for
its own tax purposes. See Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 17-18 (rejecting a similarly restrictive argument
regarding the use of intangible trademarks in taxing state). The Constitution does not impose such a
taxpayer-driven restriction on New Mexico's taxing policy. See Sonic Indus. v. State, 11 P.3d 1219,
1223 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
154. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8.
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state company to collect the California Use Tax based on the physical
presence of two National Geographic offices in California."55 Although
the Court ruled in California's favor in National Geographic, it rejected
California's legal characterization of the use tax collection nexus test
(i.e., the "slightest presence" test).1 56 While both the United States Su-
preme Court and the California Supreme Court discussed the slightest
presence test in dicta, neither court defined the phrase in their opinions in
National Geographic.1
57
In footnote eight the Court was attempting, imprecisely, to apply
the well known maxim de minimis non curat lex (i.e., the law does not
deal with trifles).158 After all, one diskette owned by a North Dakota
resident used only once to order goods from Quill, in the context of an
155. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977).
156. Id.
157. See id.; Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 547 P.2d 458, 462 (Cal.
1976).
158. "The function of the maxim is ... as an interpretive tool to inject reason into technical
rules of law and to round-off the sharp comers of our legal structure." Max L. Veech & Charles R.
Moon, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 45 MICH. L. REV 537, 543 (1947). Another application of the de
minimis maxim is in the area of inadvertence. The Multistate Tax Commission has noted the follow-
ing:
The presence is inadvertent when it does not represent a conscious choice of the out-of-
state business to submit to the jurisdiction of the taxing State. A conscious choice to
submit to the jurisdiction to the taxing State exists when the presence arises from a regu-
lar and systematic business practice, the pursuit of an established company policy on a
continuing basis, an affirmative decision of management, or a step taken to assist in the
establishment and maintenance of a market in the taxing State with respect to the sale for
which the imposition of a use tax collection obligation may be imposed ....
Example 3: Corporation A is an out-of-state business with respect to State 1. Corporation
has a presence in State I derived solely from the fact that a customer in violation of its af-
firmative covenants to the business moved the property sold by installment and which the
business has a perfected security interest from an authorized locality in another State to
State 1. The presence of Corporation A in State I is de minimis. The presence is inadver-
tent, because it did not arise from Corporation A's conscious submission to the jurisdic-
tion of State 1.
Example 4: Corporation A is an out-of-state business with respect to State 1. Corporation
A's business is the rental of scaffolding for use at construction projects. Corporation A's
business is generally limited to contractors who operate in the same State as Corporation
A. Corporation A has a presence in another State, State 1, derived solely from the fact
that one of its customer's [sic] has rented scaffolding that it has taken to a construction
project in State I. Corporation A's rental agreement with this customer gives no indica-
tion, and the personnel of Corporation A have no understanding, that the scaffolding was
to be used in State 1. Corporation A has no reason to know that any of its scaffolding has
ever been used before in State I or that it was going to be used in State I in this instance.
The presence of Corporation A in State I is de minimis. The presence is inadvertent, be-
cause it did not arise from Corporation A's conscious submission to the jurisdiction of
State 1.
Constitutional Nexus, supra note 46, at 13-14. Though these draft guidelines were never promul-
gated, they express many years of thought by their primary drafter, Paull Mines, General Counsel to
the Multistate Tax Commission.
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insignificant legal sideline issue, is not the stuff of which jurisprudence
should be made.
C. Inconsistent Application of the Bright-Line Test
Lizzie, Lizzie, have you tasted
For my sake the fruit forbidden?
Must your light like mine be hidden,
Your young life like mine be wasted,
Undone in mine undoing
And ruined in my ruin,
Thirsty, cankered, goblin-ridden?5 9
Courts interpreting Quill have struggled to divine what satisfaction
of the Commerce Clause requires from a number of Supreme Court and
appellate court interpretations, particularly laboring on the meaning of
the bright-line physical presence test. 160 This is exactly the opposite of
what the Quill Court intended, as the Court thought it was offering a
clear rule.' 61 It did no such thing. Instead, constitutional jurisprudence in
this area remains a "quagmire."'' 62
In Brown's Furniture, for example, an out-of-state company made
942 in-state deliveries over ten months.' 63 The court found that the de-
fendant's actions had "traveled well beyond the 'safe harbor [created] for
vendors whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by
common carrier or the United States mail."",164 "Through its deliveries,
Brown's Furniture [was] physically present in Illinois on an almost con-
tinuous basis."'165 However, when faced with this situation, is a court not
asking itself, in the face of any other clear direction, whether it would be
fair to tax the defendant? 66
159. Rossetti, supra note 1, at 294-95.
160. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 331 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[lI]t is a
sure bet that the vagaries of 'physical presence' will be tested to their fullest in our courts.").
161. See id. at 315 ("Such a rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority
to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.").
162. Id. (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959)).
163. Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795, 803 (Il. 1996).
164. Id.
165. Id. (internal citations omitted).
166. The Brown's Furniture court spends some time examining the number of contacts, de-
scribing them as 942 total visits "averaging between 15 and 18 trips into Illinois per month, or a
minimum of about one every other day." Id. The court then quoted Justice White's statement in Quill
that "[r]easonable minds surely can ... differ over what showing is required to make out a 'physical
presence' adequate to justify imposing responsibilities for use tax collection." Id. (quoting Quill,
504 U.S. at 330-31 (White, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (alterations in original).
Unfortunately, the Brown's Furniture court took the quote out of context. In context, Justice White
was explaining that the "few floppy disks" Quill had in North Dakota might satisfy the physical
presence test. This Illinois court used an out-of-context quote to reject the bright-line test because,
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Because fairness is at the heart of the Due Process Clause, not the
Commerce Clause, 167 the courts should employ the bright-line nexus test
created by Quill: they should examine physical presence in the state be-
fore sales and use tax jurisdiction attaches. The use of the Quill-
mandated bright-line test would have several effects. First, it would make
sales and use tax nexus jurisprudence theoretically consistent by shifting
fairness considerations back into the due process arena. Second, it would
restore the clear holding of Quill. Third, it would provide the lower
courts with certainty 168 in the area of sales and use tax collection. 169
Because physical presence is no longer the sine qua non of a Due
Process Clause inquiry as it was during the Pennoyer era, 17 the modem
minimum contacts test is easily met. Thus, courts tend to pay only lip
service to due process, yet wind up engaging in fairness calculations in
their Commerce Clause analysis. Courts should begin their constitutional
inquiry with the Commerce Clause, and then proceed to the Due Process
Clause. By discussing the Commerce Clause first, the mistake made by
some courts confusing Commerce Clause concerns with Due Process
Clause concerns can be avoided.
Cases with fact patterns close to the bright-line have caused lower
courts the most difficulty in applying Quill. The Florida, Arizona, and
Kansas cases below illustrate three different ways that courts have
avoided the physical presence bright-line test, while the New York case
implicitly, it wanted to weigh all the factors before finding that there was "physical presence" in
Illinois. Because trucks are physical and they can enter a state, it is logical to argue that the truck
was physically present in the state it entered.
167. Congress has plenary authority to enact legislation regulating interstate commerce, but if
that legislation does not comport with notions of fundamental fairness the Court can invalidate con-
gressional legislation on Due Process Clause grounds. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305; PAUL J. HARTMAN &
CHARLES A. TROST, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 2:1 (1981). For
example, Congress could pass legislation allowing states to require every seller of tangible personal
property in interstate commerce to collect the destination state's sales tax, and that the collected tax
must be remitted, in-person by the owner of the company, on an hourly basis. While this legislation
would be valid under the Commerce Clause, it would certainly run afoul of the Due Process Clause.
168. Adam Smith, the 18th century Scottish philosopher who many consider the father of capi-
talism, explained that every good tax must have four characteristics, one of which is certainty. ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 778 (Edwin Can-
nan ed., 1965) (1776). The bright-line test provides this desired certainty when applied to out-of-
state entities with any physical presence in the state.
169. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (bright-line test "reduces litigation").
170. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Decided shortly after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Pennoyer stood for the proposition that the Due Process Clause required
physical presence in a state before a state court could exercise in-personam jurisdiction over a non-
domiciliary. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The physical presence era
ended when the Court decided International Shoe in 1945. See id. (substituting "minimum contacts"
for "physical presence").
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below is an example of a court applying Quill's simple test as it was
meant to be applied.
1. Share International
In Share, the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted Quill by creat-
ing two Commerce Clause nexus tests. 171 Share involved a Texas-based
corporation that entered Florida for three days each year to sell and dis-
play chiropractic merchandise at a chiropractic convention.1 72 The court
adopted the Florida District Court of Appeals' reasoning that Quill cre-
ated two tests under the Commerce Clause. 173 The lower court first held
that the bright-line test must be met, which Share met through its physi-
cal presence in Florida.1 74 Second, the court found that a facts-and-
circumstances test must be met to establish "substantial nexus." 175 Ap-
plying this third and otherwise unknown nexus test, the court found that
Share did not have nexus because three days in a state is not enough to
create "substantial nexus. 176
Baffling is the word that comes to mind after reading Share because
it turns Quill on its head. Quill considered adopting a facts-and-
circumstances test, but expressly rejected that approach for the simplicity
of a bright-line test. 177 One could dismiss Share as aberrational, but such
a characterization would be unfounded given the number of jurists who
have examined the case. A more plausible answer lies in the sub-text of
the case: the state revenue department required an out-of-state company
to pay $77,933 in taxes1 78 for all of its sales into Florida during a three-
day visit to a convention in Miami Beach. 79
At first blush it might not seem fair to subject an out-of-state com-
pany to the state's tax jurisdiction for a three-day visit. However, if the
Share court was concerned with fairness, it should have addressed those
concerns under the familiar Due Process Clause rubric by applying the
minimum contacts test and determining whether, under all of the circum-
stances, Florida violated "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
171. See Dep't of Revenue v. Share Int'l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1996), aff'g 667 So. 2d
226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The Florida Supreme Court adopted the District Court of Appeals'
opinion as its own. See id. at 1362.
172. Id. at 1363.
173. Id. at 1362-63.
174. Share, 667 So. 2d at 230.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
178. In all likelihood, by the time this litigation began, it was impracticable for Share to pass
along this tax to its customers given statute of limitation constraints.
179. Share, 676 So. 2d at 1363.
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justice" in the application of its use tax in this case.180 After all, if a com-
pany purposefully avails itself of a market, it should not complain of the
state's tax jurisdiction.' 8'
The Share court could have written an opinion consistent with Quill
by doing the following: First, the court should have looked at the Com-
merce Clause and held, as it did, that Share had crossed the bright-line
test established by Quill. Second, the court should then have discussed
the Due Process Clause and fleshed out any fairness concerns over Flor-
ida's application of its regulatory tax scheme. The court would have
noted that Share had "nexus aplenty"' 82 in Florida through the following
activities: mailing flyers into the state, mailing catalogs into the state,
selling thousands of dollars worth of equipment to Florida chiropractors,
and yes, attending a trade show for three days each year.183 From a due
process standpoint, Share had nothing to complain about as its activities
were directed to Florida chiropractors. If Share had wanted to avoid Flor-
ida's tax jurisdiction, it merely had to avoid ever entering the state and
thereby never cross the bright-line. If the Florida court had looked at the
case in reverse by evaluating the Commerce Clause first and the Due
Process Clause second, it should have come to the conclusion mandated
by Quill. Under International Shoe and its progeny, it would have been
fair to impose Florida's tax jurisdiction on Share.'
84
2. Care Computer
In Care Computer, the Arizona courts misinterpreted Quill by ig-
noring the bright-line physical presence test and using Quill's rejected
facts-and-circumstances test instead. 185 Care Computer, located in Wash-
ington State, provided software and hardware to nursing homes located
in Arizona.1 86 Most of its transactions were by mail and telephone, but
some of its activities occurred in Arizona. 8 7 These in-state activities in-
cluded the following: a lease for a general ledger program, a lease for
180. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
181. Id. at 308 (company that mails goods into a state "clearly has 'fair warning that [its] activ-
ity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."').
182. D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988).
183. Share, 676 So. 2d at 1363.
184. In addition, this tax met the other three requirements that all state taxes must meet: the tax
was fairly apportioned since only Florida was asserting the right to tax Share; the tax did not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce since in-state sellers were treated identically to Share; and the
tax was fairly related to the service provide by the state as demonstrated by Florida's roads, police
services, and functioning court system. See generally Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977).
185. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Care Computer Sys., Inc., 4 P.3d 469, 471 (Ariz. 2000).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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three programs with a computer, a salesman entering the state for one- to
two-day trips each year, and software training personnel entering Ari-
zona for approximately twenty-one days each year.' 88 Based on these
facts, the Arizona State Board of Tax Appeals held that Care Computer
did not have enough nexus with Arizona to bring Care Computer into
Arizona's tax jurisdiction. 189 The Board reasoned that "a business must
have more than just a large number of sales and occasional visits of per-
sonnel."'1 90 Counting the number of visits is a clear indication that the
Board was employing a facts-and-circumstances test over the bright-line
physical presence test.
The Arizona Court of Appeals overturned the Board's decision, but
did so using Due Process Clause language in place of Commerce Clause
language.' 9 1 The court explained that the "focus [is] on whether the ac-
tivities performed on Care's behalf in Arizona were 'significantly associ-
ated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this
state for sales."",192 The court got to the right result, but used the wrong
reasoning; 193 the bright-line was all that was needed.
3. Intercard
The Kansas Supreme Court also misinterpreted Quill when it ap-
plied a facts-and-circumstances test, counting the number of in-state vis-
its; it did not apply Quill's straight-forward bright-line test. 194 Intercard
was a Missouri-based business that sold electronic card reading systems
to Kinko's stores in Kansas.' 95 Intercard's technicians entered Kansas
eleven times during the three-year audit period to install the machines. 96
The Kansas Supreme Court summarized the case law properly by stating:
[T]he Commerce Clause requires a taxing state to have substantial
nexus with an out-of-state business to impose use tax collection and
remittance duties. Substantial nexus requires a finding of physical
presence in the taxing state. The continuous physical presence of of-
188. Id. at 471-72.
189. Care Computer Sys. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, No. 1049-93-S (Ariz. B.T.A., April 4,
1995).
190. Id.
191. Care Computer Sys., Inc., 4 P.3d at 471 (examining number of contacts to determine if
there was substantial nexus).
192. Id. (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250
(1987)).
193. As cases move to either extreme of the bright-line, courts tend to use less precise language
because the nexus has become clear enough to do so. Cases closer to the line require more thoughtful
analysis.
194. In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d 1111, 1122-23 (Kan. 2000).
195. Id. at 1113.
196. Id.
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fices and employees in a taxing state is sufficient to impose a use
tax collection duty even though the in-state presence is unrelated to
the transaction being taxed. Mail-order sales without more are a'safe harbor' for out-of-state vendors . . . . The physical presence
requirement may turn on the presence in the taxing state of a small
sales force, plant, or office.' 97
But then in the next sentence, the Intercard court imports due proc-
ess language into the Quill Commerce Clause test: "The question is
whether Intercard's installation activities in the state of Kansas constitute
a physical presence sufficient to establish a substantial nexus with the
state.' 98 The word "sufficient" changes the bright-line test into a facts-
and-circumstances test. The court then proceeds to hold that eleven visits
by technicians is not enough to establish a substantial nexus in Kansas. 199
Intercard is likely to plague the Kansas courts for years as compa-
nies struggle to determine whether they have a nexus in the state.2 °°
Clearly eleven visits is not enough to create sales and use tax nexus in
20Kansas. 01 What about twenty visits? Maybe fifteen is enough? Or how
about twelve? "[A bright-line] rule firmly establishes the boundaries of
legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes
and reduces litigation concerning those taxes." 202 Intercard does not ad-
vance Quill's goal of reduced litigation, moving instead in the opposite
direction towards years of increased litigation in Kansas.
If the Intercard court had instead reversed its inquiry, it may have
come to a different conclusion. First, the court should have addressed the
Commerce Clause nexus test and determined that Intercard was indeed
physically present in the state. Intercard never denied sending its em-
ployees into Kansas. Second, the court should have examined whether it
would nonetheless have been fair for Kansas to impose its sales and use
tax jurisdiction on this Missouri-based company. The fairness inquiry
197. Id.
198. Id. (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 1122-23.
200. The Kansas Supreme Court has already begun to distinguish Intercard by describing it as
a case where the taxpayer's "only presence in Kansas [was] related to post-sale service .... " In re
Family of Eagles, Ltd., 66 P.3d 858, 865 (Kan. 2003). Why post-sale contacts would be less signifi-
cant than pre-sale contacts is unclear. For example, many consumers purchasing expensive personal
computers through a mail-order catalog might be hesitant to purchase the equipment without an on-
site warranty contract. Is the Kansas court really saying that post-sale contacts to install or repair
tangible personal property are less significant than pre-sale activities, especially when the post-sale
contacts were contemplated at the time of purchase? In any event, a pre-sale versus post-sale discus-
sion requires a facts-and-circumstances inquiry expressly rejected by Quill when it established the
bright-line test, and attempts to move Negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence back one hundred
years to a time when such formal inquiries were meaningful.
201. Intercard, 14 P.3d at 1122-23.
202. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
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would have looked at Intercard's contacts with Kansas: delivery of card
reading machines through a common carrier; eleven employee visits into
Kansas to install the card reading machines; and 158 sales into Kansas
totaling $164,967.203 It certainly would be fair to subject a company with
this many purposeful contacts to Kansas' sales and use taxes.24
The main problem in Intercard occurred when the court separated
the eleven visits from the other contacts, applying a fairness analysis
only to the eleven visits. However, even under the Due Process Clause,
eleven visits should have been sufficient because the Supreme Court has
made clear the following:
[J]urisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due
process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal
system that define the due process standard of "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice." That standard was developed by
analogy to "physical presence," and it would be perverse to say it
could now be turned against that touchstone of jurisdiction. '0 5
Counting the number of contacts with a state only blurs the bright-
line established by Quill and can only lead to years of litigation over how
many contacts are required before an out-of-state business is required to
collect the use tax.
203. Brief for Appellant at Ex. B, In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d 1111 (Kan. 2000)
(No. 83,802).
204. At oral argument, a justice on the Kansas Supreme Court asked the Department of Reve-
nue why they did not assess Kinko's stores, the consumer of the tangible personal property. The
Department of Revenue conceded that they had missed the statute of limitations for assessing
Kinko's stores, but could still assess Intercard since the non-filer statute of limitations was longer.
The justice commented that the state was after "the pot of gold." Telephone Interview with Shirley
Sicilian, former General Counsel, Kansas Department of Revenue (Jan. 9, 2004). But this justice
merely had to look at the Kansas statute to realize that the legislature authorized the Department of
Revenue to issue an assessment either against the retailer or the consumer-this decision was left to
the discretion of the Department of Revenue. Nevertheless, if the Intercard court thought that there
was a fairness problem, it should have addressed it as a fairness problem, not as a Commerce Clause
problem.
205. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990). Burnham, a New Jersey resident,
was served with process by a California court while visiting his children in California over a single
weekend. He maintained that the California court did not have personal jurisdiction over him be-
cause he did not have "minimum contacts" with California, apparently disregarding the fact that
physical presence remains the foundation and hallmark of a court's ability to establish personal
jurisdiction. The sole basis for jurisdiction over the defendant was the defendant's physical presence
in California.
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4. Orvis
A completely different line of thought stems from Orvis, a New
206York case. Orvis stands for the proposition that "the physical presence
requirement within the substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto test
... need not be substantial 20 7 In other words, the amount of visits is
irrelevant since the test is only of physical presence.
Orvis was a Vermont-based company that sold its products almost
exclusively through mail-order catalogs, though it did sell some mer-
chandise to wholesalers in New York.208 Sales to New York customers
ranged from $1 million to $1.5 million during the audit period, with ap-
proximately fifteen percent of the sales consisting of wholesale pur-
chases by approximately nineteen wholesale customers. 2 9 Orvis' testi-
mony at trial "suggest[ed] systematic visitation to all of its as many as 19
wholesale customers on the average of four times a year., 210
While Orvis conceded that it had physical presence in New York, it
contended that the Quill standard was "substantial physical presence"
(i.e., a facts-and-circumstances test).21 1 The New York Court of Appeals
opined that
[A]cceptance of the thesis urged by [the taxpayers]-that Quill
made the substantial nexus prong ... an in-State substantial physi-
cal presence requirement-would destroy the bright-line rule ....
Inevitably, a substantial physical presence test would require a"case-by-case evaluation of the actual burden imposed" on the indi-
vidual vendor involving a weighing of factors such as number of lo-
cal visits, size of local sales offices, intensity of direct solicitations,
etc., rather than the clear-cut line of demarcation the Supreme Court
sought to keep intact. 212
By separating the Commerce and Due Process Clauses, the Orvis
court kept apples and oranges separate and, as such, was able to apply
the physical presence test as articulated in Quill. The court did not even
feel the need to discuss the Due Process Clause, except in passing, be-
cause of Orvis' sales of $1 million directed to New York customers. Or-
vis will help reduce litigation in New York because tax professionals un-
206. Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654 N.E.2d 954 (N.Y. 1995); see also Magnatek
Controls, Inc. v. Revenue Div., 562 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (explicitly adopting the
Orvis standard); Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795, 802-03 (111. 1996).
207. Orvis, 654 N.E. 2d at 960-61.
208. Id. at 955.
209. Id. at 961.
210. Id. at 962.
211. Id. at 959.
212. Id. at 960 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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derstand that their clients "dare not dip their toes within New York's
borders without incurring New York taxes. 21 3
III. BRIDGING THE QUILL CHASM
There are four remaining issues that need to be addressed before the
Quill chasm can be fully bridged, bringing us to a complete understand-
ing of this seminal state tax case. First, because Quill employed a physi-
cal presence test, this Part will review some cases decided when physical
presence was the test for Due Process Clause nexus cases. Second, the
issue of how long a nexus lasts once it is established is discussed. Third,
a model statute that states can enact to reduce the compliance costs on
very small out-of-state businesses is provided. Fourth, a hard look is
taken at the ethics of the tax profession and asks how Quill, a case that
purported to provide clarity, could cause so much confusion.
A. Physical Presence Before International Shoe
The physical presence test is not a new test, and was, up until 1945,
used exclusively by courts in the United States to determine personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state businesses . 4 Examining these older cases
allows us to consider how courts employed the physical presence test,
and apply those cases to the post-Quill world.
Let us step back for a moment and ask ourselves what it really
means for a corporation to be physically present in a jurisdiction. After
all, corporations are legal fictions that really do not exist anywhere ex-
cept on a piece of paper, which is often in a drawer in Delaware. Judge
Leamed Hand understood this issue, sixty years before Quill, when he
wrote the following:
It scarcely advances the argument to say that a corporation must be"present" in the foreign state, if we define that word as demanding
such dealings as will subject it to jurisdiction, for then it does no
more than put the question to be answered. Indeed, it is doubtful
whether it helps much in any event. It is difficult, to us it seems im-
possible, to impute the idea of locality to a corporation, except by
virtue of those acts which realize its purposes. The shareholders, of-
ficers and agents are not individually the corporation, and do not
carry it with them in all their legal transactions. It is only when en-
gaged upon its affairs that they can be said to represent it, and we
can see no qualitative distinction between one part of its doings and
another, so they carry out the common plan. If we are to attribute
213. Id. at 181 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
214. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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locality to it at all, it must be equally present wherever any part of
its work goes on, as much in the little as in the great.
215
The presence of an individual is fairly simple to determine (barring
an existential inquiry far beyond the scope of this Article); a person lives
in New York and vacations in Florida, with a global positioning system
being able to track his exact location anywhere along 1-95 as he travels
back and forth. Even an anomalous situation such as the "four corners"
area of the United States, where it is possible to be in Arizona, Colorado,
New Mexico and Utah simultaneously, presents little in the way of intel-
lectual complexity when trying to determine where an individual is pre-
sent. 216 Anglo-American jurisprudence has been dealing with jurisdiction
based on physical presence for centuries, 21 7 with the earliest reported
case on the subject predating England's first colony in America-Sir
Walter Raleigh's lost colony and its famous baby Virginia Dare2 18-by
219over one hundred years.
Corporations, however, are much harder to locate than are people.
Justice Frankfurter noted that "[w]hen the litigants are natural persons
the conceptions underlying venue present relatively few problems in ap-
plication. But in the case of corporate litigants these procedural problems
are enmeshed in the wider intricacies touching the status of a corporation
in our law." 220 These "intricacies" have resulted in a long, somewhat tor-
tured development of the law, and though they occasionally result in dif-
ferent outcomes, they have all been grounded in the notion "that the
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power."2
2'
Initially, corporations were considered present only in the jurisdic-
tion of their creation. This doctrine resulted from developments under
which laws governing private corporations were based on the existing
215. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
216. For example, X is a tourist standing in all four states simultaneously. His archenemy Y
takes this moment to shoot him because he wants to be the first person to shoot someone in four
states simultaneously. X survives the shooting and sues Y. Where? He could sue in the state where
he was present when the shooting occurred, which here means he can sue in Arizona, Colorado, New
Mexico, or Utah.
217. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1990) (upholding use of the
physical presence test when someone was temporarily in California).
218. In 1587, the English established their first settlement in the New World on Roanoke Is-
land, North Carolina. During that first year, Virginia Dare became the first person born to English
parents in America, though what became of her has become a mystery. When English ships returned
to the colony in 1590, the colony was missing. There is much speculation as to whether they may
have been massacred by the Indians or by the Spanish, against whom the English were at war during
that time.
219. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608 (citing Bowser v. Collins, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482) (the
first reported case holding that a court judgment is void when there is lack ofjurisdiction)).
220. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939).
221. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
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law of municipal corporations.222 This situation soon proved impractica-
ble and unjust. The industrial revolution led to the development of the
large, multistate corporation operating in several jurisdictions. When un-
able to attach property for an in rem suit,223 the injured were left without
recourse for acts committed outside a corporation's state of incorpora-
tion.224 It became clear that the old laws were obsolete.
The courts set out to remedy this problem, first through the consent
theory of jurisdiction where corporations doing business within a state
were required by law to consent to the state's jurisdiction over them. 225
Because states were legally able to exclude corporations from their state
altogether, they could place conditions on corporations' admission to the
state, including advance consent to state court jurisdiction.226 Often such
consent required corporations to designate an officer upon whom service
of process could be made for the corporation. Sometimes, however, con-
sent was deemed implied by virtue of the corporation's operation within
the state. In such instances, a state official was served with process in
place of an agent of the corporation. 227
In the midst of the development of consent theory, a second basis
for jurisdiction was developing, namely presence of the corporation. This
basis of jurisdiction was developed by the courts believing consent
would not always hold. States could not legally prevent corporations en-
gaged in interstate commerce from entering their borders, and so there
would not always be a formal admission resulting in implied consent.228
Thus, a basis for jurisdiction based on corporate location was needed. As
discussed above, corporate presence was often a difficult concept to ar-
229ticulate, other than with an "I know it when I see it" kind of response.
Corporate presence came to be defined by actions taken on the corpora-
tion's behalf. Eventually, such actions came to be known as "doing busi-
ness" in a state or, in other words, "doing business within the state in
222. William F. Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry on
Business Within the Territory, 30 HARV. L. REV. 676, 686 (1919).
223. "An action determining the title to property and the rights of the parties, not merely
among themselves, but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest in that property."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 32 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "action in rem").
224. See Louis P. Haffer, Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations as Defendants in
the United States Supreme Court, 17 B.U. L. REV. 639, 639 (1937).
225. Cahill, supra note 222, at 678.
226. Id. at 689.
227. Vance E. Leininger, Jurisdiction-Service of Process-Foreign Corporations-Three
Related Elements to be Considered, 27 NEB. L. REV. 66, 66-67 (1948).
228. Haffer, supra note 224, at 640.
229. Justice Potter Stewart made this phrase famous in an obscenity case that was before the
Court. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is pre-
sent there. 23°
It is no surprise that decisions regarding what constitutes "doing
business" have always been very fact specific, but nevertheless several
key principles have arisen from these physical presence Due Process
Clause cases-principles that can be imported into the Negative Com-
merce Clause physical presence test mandated by Quill. When determin-
ing whether a corporation has a physical presence in a state, most inquir-
ies focus on a few key areas: the use of representatives, the parent corpo-
ration's use of subsidiaries, and the corporation's overall course of busi-
ness within the state.23'
Having representatives 232 in the state is one of the more common
means by which a corporation has been found to be doing business. The
Sixth Circuit held that a corporation's employment of a mechanic who
routinely adjusted and maintained machines it had manufactured was a
sufficient contact, and held that the corporation was doing business in
Ohio. 233 However, the maintenance was not performed as part of the
sales contract; it was performed whether or not the machinery had been
purchased directly from the corporation, and continued for an indefinite
period of time. 234 Another typical example comes from the Third Circuit,
where a corporation was held to have presence through its representa-
tives when it employed local agents to purchase wood pulp that was then
shipped free on board235 to the out-of-state manufacturing plant.236
Under general corporate law, corporations are treated as distinct le-
gal entities; 237 however, in the area of jurisdiction, courts examine more
closely the relationship between a parent corporation and its subsidiaries
to determine whether one or the other is doing business in a state.238 A
railroad company was found to be doing business in New York by virtue
230. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
231. Cahill, supra note 222, at 695-96 ("A corporation may be said to be present in a state
when any member of the corporate group is within the state's territorial limits on authorized busi-
ness.").
232. A representative is nothing more than "[o]ne who stands for or acts on behalf of another."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (8th ed. 2004).
233. Cone v. New Britain Mach. Co., 20 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1927).
234. Id. at 595.
235. "Free on board" is a mercantile-contract term allocating the rights and duties of the buyer
and the seller of goods with respect to delivery, payment, and risk of loss, whereby the seller must
clear the goods for export, and the buyer must arrange for transportation. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 671 (8th ed. 2004).
236. Meade Fibre Co. v. Varn, 3 F.2d 520, 521-22 (3d Cir. 1925).
237. JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS §7.01 (2d ed. 2003) ("Recogni-
tion of a corporate personality generally is considered to be the most distinct attribute of the corpora-
tion.").
238. See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 228 (1913).
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of the strong ties it maintained with its parent. 239 The parent owned all of
the funded debt, mortgages, obligations, and assets of the subsidiary, and
the two appeared to jointly operate the rail line from a common office
located in New York City.240 The United States Supreme Court further
explained that the two companies shared common officers and agents,
and that the annual report referred to the subsidiary as part of the par-
ent. 2 4 1
In another parent-subsidiary case, a West Virginia bus line was held
to be doing business in Virginia due to the activities of a subsidiary.2 42
Although the bus lines were separate legal entities, each operating in its
respective state, their relationship was very informal. 243 There were no
written contracts between the two, and the two corporations had a com-
mon directorate and office.
244
In at least one instance, however, the Supreme Court respected the
corporate form when a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary had properly
and vigorously maintained separate operations.245 The corporations main-
tained separate books, and all their transactions were conducted as if the
246two were completely separate. 6 In reaching its decision, the Court noted
that although the separation may have been "merely formal," it was
"real" and "not pure fiction. 247
In some instances, the Supreme Court has focused not on a particu-
lar circumstance, but rather on the totality of a corporation's contacts
with a state to determine whether it is doing business there. In Interna-
tional Harvester Co. of America v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, the
Court held that a corporation was doing business in Kentucky by virtue
of its course of business in the state, including the solicitation of orders
and collection of payments. 248 The court said these were not sporadic
activities, but rather were regular and systematic activities in Ken-
tucky, 249 even though the corporation had attempted to withdraw itself
239. Id.
240. Id. at 224.
241. Id. at 225.
242. Atl. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Metz, 70 F.2d 166 (1934).
243. Id. at 167.
244. Id
245. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925). For a full discussion of
the Cannon Doctrine, including criticisms, see John A. Swain, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. Rev.
445 (2004)
246. Cannon Mfg. Co., 267 U.S. at 335.
247. Id. at 337.
248. 234 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1914); see also Paul E. Farrier, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corpo-
rations, 17 MINN. L. REV. 270, 275 (1932); Haffer, supra note 224, at 640.
249. Int'l Harvester Co., 234 U.S. at 585.
2006] 619
Seattle University Law Review
from Kentucky by removing all offices, revoking the resident agent's
authority to accept orders, and shipping all products free on board from a
carrier outside the State.25
The Court has also ignored form-over-substance arguments con-
cerning contractual formalities to hold that contractual niceties will not
trump business realities. In 1905, the Court ruled that a business with no
offices or permanent agents in New York was nonetheless present in
New York, even though the company was incorporated in Pennsylvania,
had its office in Pennsylvania, and made out and executed all of its con-
tracts in Pennsylvania. 251 This company was in the business of insuring
property in several states and argued that because all of its contracts were
252made in Pennsylvania, it was only doing business in Pennsylvania. A
skeptical Court opined
[I]f not doing business in such case, what is it doing? It is doing the
very act provided for in its contract, at the very place where, in case
a loss occurred, the company contemplated the act should be done;
and it does it in furtherance of the contract, and in order to carry out
its provisions, and it could not properly be carried out without this
act being done; and the contract itself is the very kind of contract
which constituted the legal business of the company, and for the
purpose of doing which it was incorporated .... We think it would
be somewhat difficult for the defendant to describe what it was do-
ing in New York, if it was not doing business therein, when sending
its agents into the state to perform the various acts of adjustment
provided for by its contracts, and made necessary to carry them
out.2
53
These Due Process Clause cases exemplify some of the activities
that were found to create physical presence. While an exhaustive survey
of the Pennoyer era cases is beyond the scope of this Article, it is clear
that the tendency in this era was for courts to interpret physical presence
descriptively; the contacts with the forum would create jurisdiction. 254
Judge Learned Hand avoided the substantive metaphysical interpretation
by explaining that "[w]hen we say, therefore, that a corporation may be
sued only where it is 'present,' we understand that the word is used, not
literally, but as shorthand for something else. '255
250. See id. at 584.
251. Pa. Lumbermen's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 408-09 (1905).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 415.
254. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
255. Id.
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With the International Shoe decision in 1945, the courts were free
to find jurisdiction under a different rubric than physical presence. If In-
ternational Shoe had not been decided, the courts undoubtedly would
have kept adding to the list of activities that created jurisdiction under the
physical presence test, if for no other reason than to keep the law current
with modem commercial life. In other words, the Pennoyer era cases
should not be seen as the sole means of creating physical presence juris-
diction, just as the nexus activities identified in Quill should not be
viewed as exhaustive. The Due Process Clause case law evolution dem-
onstrates that this was a continually evolving area of the law that was cut
short by the more appropriate Due Process Clause minimum contacts
test. Likewise, the Commerce Clause physical presence test established
by Quill should be viewed as one that will gradually grow over time.
When the Quill Court rejected a pure economic nexus standard, it was
rejecting a hurried approach to expanding nexus in favor of the more tra-
ditional common law development to nexus.
B. Duration of Nexus
Days, weeks, months, years... 256
Quill resolved the question of when an out-of-state business has to
begin collecting the use tax, yet it left unanswered an equally important
question: When can the company stop collecting the tax? Quill estab-
lished the rule that once a business has a physical presence in a state, it
must start collecting the use tax.257 For example, if a traveling salesman
sells goods in a state for a few weeks, that salesman has subjected his
company to a use tax collection. But when that salesman leaves, should
the company be able to argue that it no longer has nexus, even though it
continues to make sales into the state through its website? The answer is
yes, and that collection requirement should last at least for one year after
the last physical contact with the state as explained below.
The duration of a sales and use tax collection obligation is a fair-
ness inquiry that essentially asks the following: "Now that you have es-
tablished nexus in a state, how long should you remain under that state's
regulatory tax authority?" While this issue has not been addressed explic-
itly by the lower courts, it has been dealt with implicitly. Could it be that
cases like Intercard and Share were actually disguised duration of nexus
cases?
How long does nexus last? Does it end the day of the last contact,
or can it last forever? Logically, terminating nexus the day after the
256. Rossetti, supra note 1, at 296.
257. See supra Part 1I.B.
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physical contact ends does not seem right. For example, imagine a com-
pany located in State Y with a showroom in State Z that ships all of its
items by common carrier to its State Z customers. The showroom is the
only nexus creating activity in State Z. On Monday the company closes
the showroom and it no longer has any physical presence in State Z. On
Tuesday the company receives an Internet order and ships an item from
its warehouse in State Y to a customer in State Z. Is this company re-
quired to collect and remit the tax to the state?
There is little guidance in this area, and states' responses vary
widely. Three states have publicized twelve months as the duration of
nexus for sales and use tax collection purposes,258 the State of Washing-
ton has a five year duration of nexus regulation, 259 two states have ruled
that nexus ends on the day that physical presence ends, 260 and in Indiana,
nexus apparently lasts forever. 26' Regardless of duration-of-nexus, com-
panies registered to collect a state's sales and use tax are required by that
state to continue collecting the taxes until the company notifies the state
that it intends to stop filing.262 Should a company fail to follow a state's
administrative procedures and deregister with the state taxing authority,
it may be subject to an assessment for failure to collect the tax even when
nexus ceases.
263
258. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §3.286(b)(2) (2005); MIcH. DEP'T OF TREASURY, REVENUE
ADMIN. BULLETIN 1999-1, 3 (1999), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/rab99- I_109054_7.pdf;
Minn. Revenue Notice 00-10 (Nov. 6 2000), available at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes
/publications/revenuenotices/content/revnote_0010.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
259. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 458-20-193(7)(c) (2005).
260. Request for Ruling: Sales and Use Tax and Corporate Income Tax, No. 98-67, 1998 WL
234361, at *1-2 (Va. Dep't of Taxation) (retailer that closes all of its retail stores in Virginia no
longer has nexus with Virginia, unless there is some other physical presence in Virginia); see also 61
PA. CODE. § 56.1 (1986); 23 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 10-210-290(B)(1) (1985).
261. IND. CODE §§ 6-2.5-3-1, 5.3-2, 5.3-6 to 5.3-8 (2006). Indiana may be taking a proximate
cause approach to duration of nexus where each transaction is examined to see if it can be tied to
some past physical presence in the state.
262. GA. CODE ANN. § 48-8-46 (2005) (Georgia requires the filing of a final return before the
obligation to file ends); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.35.01.02.070(04) (2006) (must notify Idaho of partial
or complete termination of business in the state); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § KS ADC 92-19-6 (2002)
(must notify the state it is discontinuing its business in Kansas, return its certificate, and file a final
return); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 533.1(0(1) (1995) (must notify state within twenty
days of ceasing to do business in New York); Wyoming Department of Revenue, Rules and Regula-
tions, ch. 2 § 6(i), available at http://revenue.state.wy.usfPortalVBVS/uploads/Chapt.%202%20%20
Sales%20and%20Use%2OTax.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
263. The Virginia Department of Taxation ruled that an out-of-state manufacturer was required
to collect the use tax even though it no longer had nexus with Virginia. Specifically, the Department
pointed to the fact that the company was still registered to collect the tax, changing its status from a
company required to collect the tax to a company volunteering to collect the tax. "[T]he taxpayer, by
voluntarily registering, consented to the sales tax jurisdiction of the state and despite filing zero
returns, the taxpayer was a dealer for purposes of the sales tax." § 58.1-1821 Application: Retail
Sales and Use Tax, No. 95-250, 1995 WL 624420, at *1 (Va. Dep't of Taxation). From a policy
[Vol. 29:581
The Rush to the Goblin Market
A related problem in this area is the reestablishment of nexus
within a certain period of time. For example, a company establishes
nexus in State G on January 1 st by sending an employee into the state to
conduct market enhancement activities. This employee departs on Janu-
ary 31 st. The company then reestablishes nexus by sending a second em-
ployee into State G on December 1st for a two week sales solicitation
visit. Did nexus cease from February 1 st to November 30th?
Courts have implicitly accepted that nexus is not determined on a
day-to-day basis. 264 In 1944, the Supreme Court examined Iowa's use tax
in a case 265 involving a company that "from time to time ... sent travel-
ing salesmen from Minnesota into Iowa, none of whom lived in Iowa or
had headquarters in Iowa., 266 During the four year audit period, this
Minnesota company did not maintain a permanent physical presence in
Iowa, but rather would come in and out based on its business needs. 267 In
affirming Iowa's use tax, the Court explained that
The tax is what it professes to be-a non-discriminatory excise laid
on all personal property consumed in Iowa. The property is enjoyed
by an Iowa resident partly because the opportunity is given by Iowa
to enjoy property no matter whence acquired. The exaction is made
against the ultimate consumer-the Iowa resident who is paying
taxes to sustain his own state government. To make the distributor
the tax collector for the State is a familiar and sanctioned device.268
The Court tacitly accepted that nexus was created during the entire audit
period and not merely on the days in which the company had its employ-
ees in Iowa.269
Another approach to duration of nexus is one that merges a fixed
period nexus requirement with a "proximate cause" analysis.2 70 The
Multistate Tax Commission noted in a proposed guideline that
Once minimum contacts nexus or substantial nexus exists under
principles of this guideline, that nexus will continue to exist for any
sale, even though the circumstances that gave rise to the nexus have
ended, in accordance with the following principles. First, nexus will
perspective, a state would likely require out-of-state companies to collect the use tax as long as it
could possibly impel them to do so. As discussed in Part 11, the use tax is practically unenforceable
against consumers, leaving businesses as the only practicable means of enforcing the tax.
264. State Tax Comm'n v. Gen. Trading Co., 10 N.W.2d 659, 660 (Iowa 1943), affd, 322 U.S.
335 (1944).
265. Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
266. Gen. Trading Co., 10 N.W.2d at 660.
267. Id.
268. Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338.
269. See id. at 336.
270. Constitutional Nexus Guideline, supra note 46, at 16.
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be conclusively presumed to last for at least the one-year period be-
ginning at the temporal point of the end of the circumstance that
gave rise to nexus. Second, nexus will continue to exist where the
pre-existing circumstances that gave rise to the nexus have any
meaningful connection to the sale.271
This approach may be problematic from a notice standpoint. It is
deemed to end immediately upon termination of physical presence in the
state, though it is coupled with the concept of reestablishment of nexus
upon a later visit. A company that conducts business solely through tem-
porary contacts in the state is left with no guidance as to when its obliga-
tion to collect the tax ends. A company might send its employee into
State X for one week in January, thereby creating nexus, but in a situa-
tion where it does not know if it is going to have any further physical
contacts with State X during the next year. Thus, in a state like Virginia
where nexus is deemed to end the moment the physical presence ends,272
the out-of-state company is left with no real guidance. If this out-of-state
company guesses and stops collecting the sales and use tax in January-
when its physical presence ended-they will be fine if there are no fur-
ther trips into State X. However, if they guessed incorrectly because they
had to make a few more trips into State X, they will be held liable for the
uncollected tax in the interim. At a minimum, the Due Process Clause
requires fair warning of state action. An on-again-off-again duration-of-
nexus statute measured on a daily basis is unworkable and does not pro-
vide companies with adequate notice.
It is possible that lower courts have blurred Quill's bright-line test
because of the lack of guidance on the duration of nexus. For example, in
Share, sales were made into Florida after a three-day visit.273 Was the
separation of time between the in-state visit and the out-of-state sale a
concern to the Florida court? A clear duration-of-nexus statute or regula-
tion would help courts address the fairness 274 concerns that arise in cases
close to the bright-line.
One year from the last contact with the state, at a minimum, should
be the answer to the duration-of-nexus question. There are examples in
other taxes for a one year rule. Income taxes at the federal and state level
are assessed on a yearly basis, with almost every American understand-
271. Id.
272.23 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 10-210-290(B)(1) (1985).
273. Dep't of Revenue v. Share Int'l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1362, 1363 (Fla. 1996), aff'g 667 So. 2d
226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
274. "[D]ue process standards for adjudicative jurisdiction and those for legislative (or pre-
scriptive) jurisdiction are [not] necessarily identical." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,
319-20 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). How they might differ, though, is still theoretical.
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ing the significance of April 15th.275 State property taxes are assessed on
a yearly basis. 276 One might also look to the cycle of life, where we
measure our lives, seasons, and anniversaries in one year segments.
While there is nothing magical about a one year duration-of-nexus rule, it
does provide a needed level of certainty.
C. Model Statute
One potential criticism to allowing any physical presence to create
a use tax collection obligation is that it will require all out-of-state busi-
ness owners with nexus to collect the use tax, even when they are small
businesses. In some cases there might be a perceived unfairness. Amid
discussions pertaining to this Article, a colleague recounted the following
story. Some years ago he conducted a seminar in a state other than his
state of residency. During breaks at the seminar, he sold a few hundred
dollars worth of books to participants. Some time after the seminar, he
received a letter from the state taxing authority demanding that he file a
sales and use tax return. He called the state to explain that he only sold a
few items, had not collected any tax, and in any event owed less than
forty dollars in tax to the state. He perceived the tax as unfair because he
compared the amount of tax due with the amount of time spent comply-
ing with the state's requirements (e.g., reading the demand letter, phone
calls with the tax authority, and hiring a tax accountant to help him pre-
pare the forms). Though he had nexus in the state, a statutory minimum
filing threshold would have solved the problem for him and countless
other small out-of-state businesses.
States should create an exemption mechanism for out-of-state busi-
nesses that exempt the first $2000 of gross sales and its accompanying
tax liability of $100 in a state with a five percent sales and use tax rate.277
The idea is not to exempt every taxpayer's first $2000 of gross sales; the
exemption should apply only to those very small businesses that enter the
278state. The following is a suggested model statute for State Z:
275. April 15th is the date on which every federal income tax return is due unless an extension
to file a return is submitted by that date. I.R.C. § 6072(a) (1996).
276. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3010 (2005) (property must be assessed on January 1st of
each year).
277. States are in the best position to determine what amount they may want to exempt. Each
state should go through its own cost-benefit analysis and determine how much it may be willing to
exempt. For some states, $100 in tax liability may be too much, while for others it may be too low.
In any event, there is a dollar amount at which it is economically inefficient for a state to require the
filing of a tax return based solely on processing costs.
278. States have dealt with small sales in other contexts, such as garage sales. One tax service
has noted that
Most statutes exempt casual or isolated sales, sometimes also called occasional sales. The
exemption is usually limited to those not regularly engaged in the retail selling of tangible
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SMALL BUSINESS SALES & USE TAX COLLECTION EXEMPTION ACT
1. PURPOSE
1.1 The purpose of this Act is to exempt out-of-state
small businesses from collecting and remitting the
sales and use tax to State Z under the enumerated
limited circumstances.
2. DEFINITIONS
2.1 For purposes of this Act, a "small business" is an en-
tity that has annual worldwide gross sales of $10,000
or less, is a non-resident of State Z, and makes less
than $2000 of gross sales to State Z residents on an
annual basis.
3. SALES & USE TAX EXEMPTION
3.1 A small business that is not registered to collect the
sales and use tax with State Z is not required to reg-
ister, collect, or remit the tax to State Z until it
reaches $2000 of gross sales in the state. The small
business is required to register, collect, and remit the
sales and use tax to State Z for all of its sales ex-
ceeding $2000 of gross sales in the state.
3.2 This sales and use tax exemption shall apply only
until the first year in which the small business
reaches the $2000 gross sales threshold, after which
personalty. The statute may limit the exemption to a specified number of sales or a speci-
fied dollar amount of sales per year. For example, no more than two sales a year or no
more than $500 of sales a year may be allowed as exempt casual or isolated sales. Unless
specifically listed in the statute as exempt, an exemption for these sales can't be taken,
except when the statute is so worded as to not apply to casual or isolated sales. In some
states, the exemption applies to retailers' nonrecurring sales of items that aren't held in
inventory. For example, the exemption may be allowed under a statute that taxes only
sales "in the ordinary course of business." Example:
A tax statute gives this definition: "'Isolated or occasional sale' means the nonrecur-
ring sale of tangible personal property, or services taxable hereunder by a person not en-
gaged at the time of such sale in the business of selling such property or services."
RIA, ALL STATES TAX GUIDE, § 5205 (2006).
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this exemption may not be claimed in any future
years.
3.3 This exemption shall not apply to any small business
that is owned by a corporation, limited liability
company, publicly traded partnership, or any other
business entity that has world-wide gross sales of
more than $10,000.
3.4 All taxes collected by the business must be remitted
to the State.
This proposed law provides a safe harbor for small businesses and
helps focus state tax enforcement resources on larger out-of-state busi-
nesses that attempt to plan around the state's use tax collection laws.
D. Ethics and Professionalism
I ate and ate myfill,
Yet my mouth waters still,
To-morrow night I will
Buy more...279
The final issue that needs to be examined is ethics within the tax
profession. It seems odd that Quill-a case that was written to provide
clarity-could cause so much confusion among practitioners and jurists.
Is the problem that tax practitioners are using poor hermeneutics in their
briefs, or is it a lapse of ethics? 280 I suspect the latter. Pushing the legal
envelope is not the problem; the problem is ignoring the existence of an
envelope altogether.
Several examples from the news illustrate that there are those in the
tax profession that prefer financial success to ethics. 28' Perhaps most no-
toriously, the "Big Four" accounting firms 282 who dominate the tax field
used to be the "Big Five": Arthur Andersen disintegrated after the gov-
ernment pursued a criminal investigation against it for deceptive auditing
283activities related to the collapse of Enron, Inc.
279. Rossetti, supra note 1, at 287.
280. Ethics is defined as "[o]f or relating to moral action, conduct, motive or character."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (5th ed. 1979).
281. See Barney Jopson, Auditors Say Fraud Can Be Hard to Detect, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2005, at 29.
282. Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
283. Before Enron entered bankruptcy, it was the seventh largest corporation in the United
States. The top executives took nearly $1 billion from the company and investors took away nothing.
See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND
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Similarly, in August 2005, a number of "former" employees of
KPMG were indicted for criminal tax violations284 -former in that they
either were allowed to retire or were terminated before the indictment
was made public. 285 Although these partners and employees are legally
entitled to a presumption of innocence, KPMG as an entity has accepted
criminal fault, entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the
United States Department of Justice, and decided not to pay more than
$600,000 for the criminal defense of their former employees.286 Addi-
tionally, as part of the agreement with the Justice Department, KPMG
has agreed to pay nearly $500,000,000, and possibly up to $600,000,000,
to the United States Treasury, to close its private client practice, to close
its compensation and benefits practice, and to refrain from developing or
selling any pre-packaged tax product, among other significant restric-
287tions on its practice.
These recent scandals are not isolated lapses of judgment, but rather
are symptomatic of the moral vacuum of our time. Nietzsche, the Ger-
man philosopher, has summarized the prevailing metanarrative,288 or
worldview, 289 by stating the following:
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 53 (2003). Arthur Andersen was indicted and convicted for its actions
in the audit of Enron, though its conviction was overturned for improper jury instructions in Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 2131-32 (2005).
284. Sealed Indictment, United States v. Stein, No. 05CRIM. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/August%2005/KPMG%2Oindividuals%2 /IND
.pdf. In October 2005, ten more former KMPG employees were indicted. Andrew Parker, Ten More
Charged in KPMG Tax Shelter Case, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, at 30.
285. See Parker, supra note 284.
286. Letter from anonymous top-level KPMG employees to major newspapers, Department of
Justice, and U.S. Attorney's Office at 2 (Aug. 10, 2005), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/whitecollarcrime blog/files/kpmganonymous memo.pdf (arguing that a successful defense would
require millions of dollars).
287. Letter from David N. Kelley, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, to
Robert S. Bennett, attorney for KPMG, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Aug. 26,
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%/ 2OReleases/August*/2005/KPMG/2Odp
%20AGMT.pdf.
288. Metanarrative, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metanarrative (last visited Feb. 21,
2006).
A metanarrative can include any grand, all-encompassing story, classic text, or archetypal
account of the historical record. They can also provide a framework upon which an indi-
vidual's own experiences and thoughts may be ordered. These grand, all-encompassing
stories are typically characterized by some form of "transcendent and universal truth" in
addition to an evolutionary tale of human existence (a story with a beginning, middle and
an end). The majority of metanarratives tend to be relatively optimistic in their visions for
human kind, some verge on utopian, but different schools of thought offer very differing
accounts.
Id.
289. JAMES W. SIRE, NAMING THE ELEPHANT 122 (2004).
A worldview is a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be ex-
pressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may be true, partially
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What, then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms-in short, a sum of human relations, which
have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and
rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and
obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has for-
gotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and
without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and
now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.
290
This understanding--or better, misunderstanding-of truth, coupled with
avarice, have led to the perfect tax storm. If all truth is merely subjective,
something found only within each individual, then no outside standard
applies for purposes of judging anything, including a legal system. Eve-
rything becomes a matter of personal interpretation with no right or
wrong answers. "Put briefly, if the law is 'not a brooding omnipresence
in the sky,' then it can be only in one place: in us., 291 One might choose
to live one's life with that level of uncertainty, but a legal system will not
survive if relativism is the philosophy behind the system. Imagine for a
moment a legal system based on individual subjective truth:
The obvious first move is to decide whether one can found a system
on the premise that each person is his own ultimate evaluative au-
thority .... Everyone can declare what ought to be for himself, and
no one can legitimately criticize anyone else's values-what they
are or how they came to be-because everyone has equal ethical
dignity . . . .Each individual's normative statement are, for him,
performative utterances: what is said to be bad or good, wrong or
right, is just that for each person, solely by reason of its having been
uttered. 92
When people choose to ignore universal principles and rely on
themselves for truth, serious problems often result. In the context of use
tax collection, weak to non-existent arguments have been made to dis-
credit applicable Supreme Court precedent. For example, the argument
29329has been made that Scripto, Inc. v. Carson is no longer good law.294
One state tribunal has refuted this spurious argument:
true or entirely false) which we hold (consciously or subconsciously or inconsistently)
about the basic constitution of reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live
and move and have our being.
Id.
290. Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, in PHILOSOPHY AND
TRUTH 79, 84 (Daniel Breazeale ed., Humanities Press 1979) (1873).
291. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1233
(1979) (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
292. Id. at 1235.
293. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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CFC [Consolidated Fuel Corporation] also relies on Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota ... for the proposition that the rule of Scripto, Inc. v.
Carson, supra, is no longer good law. CFC misunderstands-or
misrepresents-Quill. Quill does not represent a new departure in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence; Quill is a clarification of the pre-
sent state of that law. More importantly, Quill expressly ratified the
Scripto rule.295
Should we be surprised by this result when the prevailing metanarrative
allows people 296 to interpret cases and statutes according to what is right
in their own eyes?
For thousands of years, the West 297 has recognized that truth is uni-
versal and knowable by all.298 The Western legal tradition, from which
the American legal system derives, 299 was formed with the presupposi-
tion that there are in fact universals that are transcendent. 30 0 The notion
that truth might be subjective and not universal, something known only
to the individual observer, is relatively new to Western thought and can
294. See Do Debt Collectors and Inventory Create Nexus?, 15 STATE TAX NOTES 641, 642
(1998); Nexus Issues Part I: Is Scripto GoodLaw?, 15 STATE TAX NOTEs 839, 839 (1998).
295. Consol. Fuel Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, No. 92-000230RV, 1993 WL 13010470, at *5 (Miss.
Admin. Hearing Comm'n Apr. 29, 1993).
296. This Part of the Article is not meant to disparage the honest work of many tax practitio-
ners. Many people do their work honestly and ethically, and in fact have a duty to ensure that their
clients do not pay one penny more than what they owe-that is what tax practice is about. This sec-
tion is aimed at the practitioner who either ignores the rules or is unable to see them objectively.
Also, some areas of the law are open for honest debate because there are situations where simple
analysis is not possible-tax professionals would not be needed if everything was easy to under-
stand.
297. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 2 (1983).
The West is . . . a cultural term, but with a very strong diachronic dimension. It is not,
however, simply an idea; it is a community. It implies both a historical structure and a
structured history. For many centuries the community of those people was manifested in
their common allegiance to a single spiritual authority, the Church of Rome.
Id.
298. Socrates and Plato, two of the greatest thinkers of all time, believed in universal truth.
Socrates
refused to acquiesce in the idea that truth is relative, that there is no stable norm, no abid-
ing object of knowledge. He was convinced that ethical conduct must be founded on
knowledge, and that that knowledge must be knowledge of eternal values which are not
subject to the shifting and changing impressions of sense or of subjective opinion, but are
the same for all men and for all peoples and all ages. Plato inherited from his Master this
conviction that there can be knowledge in the sense of objective and universally valid
knowledge.
1 FREDRICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: GREECE AND ROME 143 (Image Books 1993)
(1962).
299. Michael J. DeBoer, Equality as a Fundamental Value in the Indiana Constitution, 38
VAL. U. L. REV. 489, 493 (2004).
300. BERMAN, supra note 297, at 39.
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be traced to the Enlightenment. While one could argue that Galileo Gali-
lei (1 5 6 4 - 16 4 2 )0 was the first to break with the Western view of truth,
the primary person to do so was Ren6 Descartes (1592-1650)302 with his
belief that doubt was the way to arrive at certain truth.303 This Cartesian
redirection "symbolized a retreat into the individual self-consciousness
as the one sure starting-point in philosophy .... [It] set[] up the individ-
ual consciousness as the final criterion of truth. 304 Within a hundred
years, Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and John Locke (1632-1704) took
Descartes' revolutionary change to the next step and "denied altogether
the capacity of the human mind to achieve absolute truth., 30 5
Does belief in an objective standard for truth mean that we will all
come to agreement on every possible issue, including a perfect under-
standing of the Court's use tax collection jurisprudence? Of course not.
Reasonable minds can and will disagree on many issues. As heirs of the
Western legal tradition, a common understanding of truth will ensure that
everyone is playing the same game with the same rules.
The United States Treasury Department has responded to the cur-
rent ethical crisis by raising the standards of tax practice, and is going
after unethical practitioners as well as taxpayers. Given that the govern-
ment has no power to force people to do good, the power to punish bad
behavior will have to do as a poor substitute.30 6 The primary vehicle for
regulating practice and ethics before the Treasury Department is Circular
230.307 Early in 2005, Circular 230 was significantly changed, and now
tax professionals can be punished for a wider range of activities that the
Treasury Department has labeled inappropriate. While this is a good
start, it is only the placing of the finger in the proverbial dike.
301. "Galileo shattered the Aristotelian view of the universe by his skepticism concerning the
possibility of arriving at certain truth through the evidence of the senses and his resort to mathemat-
ics as the primary method of achieving certain knowledge of physical nature." HAROLD J. BERMAN,
LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 266 (2003).
302. He was 'the father of modem philosophy,' [and] a mathematical, scientific, and philoso-
phical genius." RICHARD L. PURTILL ET AL., PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANTHOLOGY 120 (1985).
303. "Descartes claimed that it is possible to arrive at indubitable knowledge through the rigor-
ous and systematic application of doubt to one's beliefs." NORMAL L. GEISLER & PAUL D.
FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY: A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 91 (1980).
304. COLIN BROWN, PHILOSOPHY & THE CHRISTIAN FAITH 52-53 (1968).
305. BERMAN, supra note 297, at 267.
306. "[I]t was necessary that external laws be handed down and that external penalties be es-
tablished for law-breakers. In this way, it was possible for people not moved by love of virtue to be
protected from evil by fear of punishment and to be restrained by their responsibilities." Hierony-
mus Zanchi, On the Law in General, 6 J. OF MARKETS & MORALITY 305, 338 (Jeffrey J. Veenstra
trans. 2003), available at http://www.acton.org/publicat/m andm/2003_spring/zanchi/.
307.31 C.F.R. § 10.0 (2002).
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The real problem is that a large number of practitioners have a
worldview that permits them to engage in behavior that is destructive to
the laws of our nation. In the legal profession, this downward slide to-
ward relativism is reflected in the ethical documents of the American Bar
Association (ABA). In 1908, the ABA created its first ethics document,
which stated the following in its preamble: "The future of the Republic,
to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and un-
sullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of
the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all
just men. 3°8 The Canons of Professional Ethics ("Canons") remained in
force until 1969, when they were superseded by the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). The Canons assumed that an objective standard
of justice existed, and that a universal standard defined "just men"; how-
ever, the Code eliminated these objective standards and moved the pro-
fession toward relativism by noting the following in its preamble:
Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone
against which to test the extent to which his actions should rise
above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for
the respect and confidence of the members of his profession and of
the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the in-
centive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The pos-
sible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.
Thus, the legal profession stopped searching for the universal ideal of
justice and instead adopted an inward looking approach. The universal
ideal was traded for the respectability of the group, which may or may
not be upholding a universal concept of truth, justice, or ethics.
After only fourteen years under the Code, the ABA adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"), which states in its pre-
amble that "a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the ap-
probation of professional peers., 310 This same concept was echoed by
that childhood philosopher, Jiminy Cricket, when he told Pinocchio to
"let your conscience be your guide." 31 Again the ABA denied the need
for a universal ideal in favor of a subjective standard, which really means
that people are free to create whatever standards they want as long as
their peers agree. If a person's conscience is rightly formed it might act
as an appropriate guide, but the conscience is not the ultimate source of
morality and ethics. One does not have to look very deeply into the lives
308. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS app. E, at 1180 (Practioner's ed. 1986)
(ABA Canons Preamble (1957)).
309. Id. app. B, at 1022 (ABA Code Preamble (1969)).
310. Id. app. C, at 1098 (ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble (1983)).
311. PINOCCHIO (Walt Disney Studios 1940).
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of notorious people that "followed their consciences" to discover viola-
tions of principles of universal truth, justice, and morality."'
At best, the ABA Rules are incomplete. They are complete for
those with properly formed consciences, who are thereby impelled to do
good. They are incomplete for those with improperly formed con-
sciences, who do not feel bound by universal principles that exist deep
within every human being.313
Given these negative changes in society and the legal profession
over the past hundred years, is it really surprising that the Treasury De-
partment and state tax agencies are having problems collecting taxes?
State tax cases do not make up a large percentage of trial and appellate
dockets, so judges must rely on briefs. If some practitioners are willing to
argue positions that do not closely follow Quill, then it follows that Court
opinions are more likely to deviate from a close reading of Quill. Jurists
do not have the time to become experts on every legal issue that comes
before their courts. This is especially true with tax cases, which jurists
jokingly identify as the most dreadful type of case that one could hear.314
A tax professional who loses his moral compass is likely to write an ob-
fuscating legal brief, which in turn may lead to a court opinion that mis-
interprets a case like Quill. Some tax practitioners have eaten at the Gob-
lin Market, and now they cannot get enough.
312. For example, Hans Frank was the leading Nazi jurist who was tried and executed at Nur-
emburg after the Second World War. The following quotations from Frank provide insights into his
conscience, which speak for themselves.
It is so obvious that it hardly needs mentioning that any participation whatsoever of the
Jew in German law-be it in a creative, interpretative, educational or critical capacity-is
impossible. The elimination of the Jews from German jurisprudence is in no way due to
hatred or envy but to the understanding that the influence of the Jew on German life is es-
sentially a pernicious and harmful one and that in the interests of the German people and
to protect its future an unequivocal boundary must be drawn between us and the Jews.
Hans Frank, Speech at the Congress of the Reich Group of University Professors at the National
Socialist Jurists' League (Oct. 3, 1936). "1 have not been hesitant in declaring that when a German is
shot, up to 100 Poles shall be shot too." Hans Frank, Remarks at a meeting of political leaders of the
NSDAP at Cracow (Jan. 15, 1944). While on trial at Nuremburg, he was able to recognize that he
and his fellow Nazis had violated universal truth and morality when he said from the stand that "a
thousand years will pass and the guilt of Germany will still not be erased." JOE J. HEYDECKER &
JOHANNES LEEB, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 347 (R.A. Downie ed. and trans., World Pub. Co. 1958).
313. "[T]he problem is mainly volitional-that it has to do with the state of our will .... [B]y
and large we know what's right and wrong but wish we didn't, and that we try to keep ourselves in
ignorance so that we can do as we please." J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WRITTEN ON THE HEART 185 (1997).
314. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Law-
yers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 525-26 (1994) ("[W]hen asked why he sings along with the Chief Jus-
tice at the Court's annual Christmas party, Justice Souter replied, 'I have to. Otherwise I get all the
tax cases.' [S]imilar remarks have been attributed to other justices.").
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IV. CONCLUSION
One may lead a horse to water,
Twenty cannot make him drink.
Though the goblins cuffed and caught her,
Coaxed and fought her,
Bullied and besought her,
Scratched her, pinched her black as ink,
Kicked and knocked her,
Mauled and mocked her,
Lizzie uttered not a word;
Would not open lip from lip
Lest they should cram a mouthful in...
At last the evil people,
Worn out by her resistance,
Flung back her penny, kicked their fruit
Along whichever road they took,
Not leaving root or stone or shoot.
315
The Supreme Court's mandate for sales and use tax nexus is a
bright-line test measured by physical presence. If a company has physi-
316cal presence in a state, it has Commerce Clause nexus. The current
confusion in lower courts can be resolved by the application of the two
nexus clauses in the following order: First, courts should apply the
Commerce Clause nexus test. If there is no physical presence in the ju-
risdiction, that is the end of the inquiry, and the out-of-state company
cannot be required to collect the sales and use tax. But if there is any
physical presence, the inquiry then proceeds to the second nexus test.
Second, courts should then apply the Due Process Clause nexus test,
which examines whether it would be fair to impose a sales and use tax
collection obligation on the out-of-state company. Invariably, that answer
will be yes because the totality of the company's contacts will generally
satisfy the Due Process Clause tests articulated in International Shoe and
its progeny.
The American legal system seeks, in part, to reduce litigation.3" 7
Employing clear nexus rules is one method of accomplishing this goal. 318
315. Rossetti, supra note 1, at 293-94.
316. Possible exceptions to the bright-line test include accidental or coerced entry into a state.
For example, a corporate jet may be forced into a state temporarily due to bad weather or because it
is forced to land after being hijacked.
317. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
318. Over the past years, a number of states have been working on the Streamlined Sales Tax
Project-a compact of member states. Its mission statement is to "develop measures to design, test
and implement a sales and use tax system that radically simplifies sales and use taxes." Streamlined
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Admittedly, unambiguous nexus rules were not visible in the past, but
the Quill Court created a clear rule with a fairly high hurdle-states must
show that a company purposefully created physical presence.1 9 In to-
day's world of Internet sales, mail-order catalogs, and telephone sales,
companies can avoid multiple state tax jurisdictions simply by never
leaving their home states; when a company chooses to leave its safe har-
bor by entering another state, it should not complain when it has to com-
ply with that state's sales and use tax laws.
Recognition of Quill's two tests in the right order-Commerce
Clause first and Due Process Clause second-will help bring coherence
to the current confusion and will assist states in controlling their tax base.
After all, the bulk of the tax collection problem is not with small busi-
nesses that enter a state, but rather is with large businesses that can create
separate subsidiaries to avoid nexus rules. Collecting the use tax from all
taxpayers promotes confidence in the tax system; allowing the Internet
savvy to avoid the use tax only encourages them to bypass their local
merchants for a small percentage savings found on a website. This type
of avoidance is neither good tax policy nor good economic policy.
We must not look at goblin men,
We must not buy their fruits:
Who knows upon what soil they fed
Their hungry thirsty roots?
320
Sales Tax Governing Board, Inc. Home Page, http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org (last visited Feb.
21, 2006). When operational, this system will greatly help in sales tax collection, though it may take
an act of Congress or a decision by the Supreme Court to overturn Quill; however, in U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), the Court allowed a state compact without
Congressional approval because that compact did not increase the power of the states over the fed-
eral government. Presumably, the Streamlined Sales Tax Project would not increase state power over
the federal government, thereby not implicating the restrictions of the Compact Clause to the Consti-
tution.
319. The Negative Commerce Clause component portion of Quill can be overturned by Con-
gress at any time because Congress "has the ultimate power to [change the test]." Quill, 504 U.S. at
318. However, enforcement of the use tax is likely to be viewed as a "new tax" (even though the tax
is over sixty years old) and thus as an impediment for Congress to relax the physical presence stan-
dard.
320. Rossetti, supra note 1, at 285.
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